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BANKRUPT POLITICS AND THE
POLITICS OF BANKRUPTCY
Adam J Levitint
The most recent round of state budget crises has resulted in calls to
permit states to file for bankruptcy in order to restructure and reduce their
financial obligations. This Article argues that these proposals are misguided
because states'financial distress is primarily a political problem created by
'fiscal federalism "-the financial relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states-and exacerbated by political agency problems. Accord-
ingly, state bankruptcy proposals need to be evaluated in political, rather
than financial, terms.
Bankruptcy can no more remake fiscal federalism than it can fix a firm
with an untenable business model. While bankruptcy might provide a tool
for mitigating political agency problems, either as a forum for negotiation or
as a "penalty default rule" that would encourage political settlements outside
of bankruptcy, it is more likely to be used to provide judicial cover for parti-
san agendas.
Attempts to use bankruptcy to solve political problems invite a reevalua-
tion of the "creditors' bargain," the dominant theory of bankruptcy law,
which argues that bankruptcy law tries to replicate the bargain that creditors
would have made themselves. This Article argues that "contractarian" ap-
proaches to bankruptcy are necessarily incomplete because they do not ac-
count for the politics of bankruptcy.
Instead, this Article sketches out a new theory of bankruptcy law as the
dynamic "armistice line" between competing interest groups. Bankruptcy is
fundamentally a distributional exercise, and the shape of bankruptcy law is
an expression of distributional norms and interest group politics rather than
an exercise in economic efficiency. A proper theoretical understanding of
bankruptcy must therefore commence from a political, rather than economic,
perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
State fiscal crises seem to be a near perennial occurrence, but
their incidence has become particularly common since the 2008
global financial collapse. In fiscal year 2012, forty-two states collec-
tively closed out $103 billion in budget shortfalls.' In an attempt to
cope with budget problems, at least forty-six states have already re-
duced services, and more than thirty states have raised taxes. 2 The
Minnesota state government even shut down for twenty days in the
summer of 2011 because the Republican legislature and Democratic
governor could not reach agreement on how to close a budget gap. 3
State fiscal crises emerge during every economic downturn and
sometimes in between downturns because state revenues are tied to
economic activity and financial markets, whereas state costs are static
or even countercyclical. 4 These crises put tremendous political strains
on the states and often entail gut-wrenching choices for state legisla-
tures about layoffs, program cuts, and tax increases. 5 Even with three
I Elizabeth McNichol et al., States Continue to Feel Recession's Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICV PRIOIUTIES, 6 (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Monica Davey, With Signing of Budget, Impasse Ends in Minnesota, N.Y. TiMES, July 21,
2011, at Al3.
4 See David A. Super, Federal-State Budgetary Interactions, in FIscAL CHALLENGES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 366, 369-70 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds.,
2008).
5 See McNichol et al., supra note 1, at 7.
1400 [Vol. 97:1399
BANKRUPT POLITICS
years of budget cuts and tax increases since 2008, many states are still
struggling to balance their budgets. 6
When an individual, firm, or municipality ends up in similar fi-
nancial distress, bankruptcy is one of several options available as a
means of restructuring debt obligations. Yet this option is not availa-
ble to the states, which at present may not file for bankruptcy.
7
Prompted by the latest round of state fiscal crises, Professor David
Skeel has proposed a plan, based on the Chapter 9 municipal bank-
ruptcy model, to permit states to file for bankruptcy.8 Prominent Re-
publican politicians have echoed this proposal,9 and Professor Steven
Schwarcz has expanded on it, even drafting a model state bankruptcy
law. a0 Professor Anna Gelpern, in contrast, has questioned whether
bankruptcy is even a helpful paradigm through which to analyze
quasi-sovereign debt problems, as discussions become freighted with
the baggage of existing U.S. bankruptcy law."1
This Article considers whether bankruptcy or any bankruptcy-
type process, regardless of its name, is in fact the right tool for ad-
dressing state fiscal crises. Significant constitutional issues lurk in any
potential state bankruptcy system, but they lie beyond the scope of
this Article, which focuses on the desirability, rather than the constitu-
tionality, of state bankruptcy. 12
In this Article, I argue that state budget crises are a structural
political problem that bankruptcy cannot be expected to fix. Cyclical
state budget crises are the inevitable outcome of the interaction be-
tween "fiscal federalism"-the financial relationship between the fed-
6 See id. at 1-3.
7 See Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for States to Escape Debt Burdens, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2011, at Al ("Unlike cities, the states are barred from seeking protection in federal
bankruptcy court.").
8 See, e.g., David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law-Not Bailouts-for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2011, at A17; David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, WKLV. STANDARD, Nov. 29,
2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/give-states-way-go-bankrupt_518378.html.
Professor Skeel has since written expanded, academic versions of his proposal. SeeDavid A.
Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-30, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1907774; David A. Skeel, Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up
(Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 382, 2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn
wps/382 (forthcoming in WHEN STATES Go BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR
THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRIsIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., forth-
coming Aug. 2012)).
9 Jeb Bush & Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at A19.
10 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State "Bankruptcy," 59 UCLA L. REv.
322, app. at 350-52 (2011) (including a "Model Federal Statute for State Debt
Restructuring").
11 See Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121
YALE L.J. 888, 891 (2012).
12 On the constitutionality of state bankruptcy, see Thomas Moers Mayer, State Sover-
eignty, State Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363 passim
(2011).
14012012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
eral government and the states-and states' legal and political
cultures. Due to the U.S. fiscal federalism arrangement, economic
downturns result in increased demands for state services at the very
time when state revenues are declining. The strains created by fiscal
federalism are exacerbated by states' self-imposed restrictions on
countercyclical deficit financing and by political agency problems that
encourage spending and tax cuts in good times and "gambling on
resurrection" in bad times.
The problems underlying state fiscal distress ultimately concern
political structures rather than finances, and they necessitate political,
rather than financial, restructuring. Accordingly, bankruptcy makes
sense only as a political tool in addressing these problems, rather than
as a means of accomplishing financial and legal restructuring.
Bankruptcy, however, is ill-equipped to accomplish political re-
structuring. It is not an adequate forum for renegotiating fiscal feder-
alism. At best, bankruptcy is a convening and negotiating tool, but it
is of limited use because it cannot bring all of a state's stakeholders to
the table. As a negotiation forum itself, bankruptcy offers only convo-
cation of and procedural assistance with creditors-a subset of states'
stakeholders or constituencies. Even then, bankruptcy offers less pro-
cedural assistance than it does for individuals or firms because central
bankruptcy principles such as having a liquidation baseline for evalu-
ating reorganization proposals (i.e., bankruptcy's "best interests" test)
and enforcing absolute priority (i.e., that no junior creditor or equity
holder is paid unless all senior creditors have been paid in full), are
inapplicable to states. While a bankruptcy regime could potentially
facilitate political negotiations outside of bankruptcy by functioning as
a type of "penalty default rule"'13 or punitive alternative to a negoti-
ated solution, bankruptcy would need to be sufficiently unattractive to
all negotiating parties for it to function in this manner. It is far from
clear that a bankruptcy regime would impose sufficient political costs
on the politicians negotiating state budgets to facilitate budget deals.
Indeed, bankruptcy might actually discourage negotiations if it of-
fered political gains that could not be achieved in a negotiated
solution.
Bankruptcy has never been a tool to deal with structural
problems in businesses, and fiscal federalism and political agency
problems are essentially structural problems for states. Bankruptcy
can reduce financial leverage and restructure debts. 14 It can elimi-
13 See infra text accompanying notes 166-69.
14 States, however, have comparatively little financial leverage in the traditional sense.
They are primarily cash-flow operations; bond debt financed only 2.3% of state expendi-
tures in fiscal year 2010. NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE
EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING FisCAL 2009-2011 STATE SPENDING 7 tbl.1 (2011), available
1402 [Vol. 97:1399
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nate legacy costs such as bad contracts or tort liability. But bankruptcy
cannot fix bad business models. Bankruptcy cannot fix the structural
political problems underlying states' budgets any more than it can
make a buggy whip maker or typewriter manufacturer profitable. Not
surprisingly, state bankruptcy proposals simply do not engage with the
sources of state budget problems.
Bankruptcy might conceivably mitigate some of the political
agency costs that exacerbate state budget problems, but it could also
easily be used as a partisan political tool. The politics of state budget
gaps are fundamentally a debate between increasing revenues (gener-
ally by raising taxes) and cutting state services and benefits. This de-
bate has strong partisan overtones. While there is a great deal of local
variation and nuance, the partisan divide can be roughly summarized
as follows. Republicans generally oppose closing budget gaps via tax
increases. Instead, they prefer cutting spending, although they some-
times have particular spending functions they wish to shield. Republi-
cans also have a strong interest in cutting compensation to unionized
public employees because public employee unions tend to support
Democrats. 15 In contrast, Democrats typically prefer to close budget
gaps by increasing revenues (usually through progressive taxation)
and cutting costs, while protecting certain social welfare programs.
Bankruptcy could be used to force service and benefits cuts that
cannot happen in the normal realm of state politics. Under a Chapter
9 model, however, bankruptcy cannot be used to force tax hikes. 16
Thus, Republican politician Newt Gingrich expressed his support for
a state bankruptcy option as a tool for enabling the renegotiation of
public employee unions' contracts:
I ... hope the House Republicans are going to move a bill in the
first month or so of their tenure to create a venue for state bank-
ruptcy, so that states like California and New York and Illinois that
think they're going to come to Washington for money can be told,
you know, you need to sit down with all your government employee
unions and look at their health plans and their pension plans and,
frankly, if they don't want to change, our recommendation is you go
into bankruptcy court and let the bankruptcyjudge change it, and I
would make the federal bankruptcy law prohibit tax increases as
part of the solution, so no bankruptcy judge could impose a tax
increase on the people of the states. 1 7
at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%2OState%2OExpenditure%2OReport.
pdf [hereinafter NASBO 2010 REPORT].
15 See, e.g., Bob Secter, Wisconsin Recall Battle Gains Steam, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 17, 2012, at
1.
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2006); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankrupt-
cies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1038, 1059-66 (1997).
17 Doug Halonen, Gingrich Seeks Bill Allowing State Bankruptcy to Avert Bailouts, PENSIONS
& INvs. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/20110110/PRINTSUB/3011099
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The possibilities for a state bankruptcy regime are hardly bounded by
Newt Gingrich's vision; one could of course imagine a different type
of bankruptcy regime in which tax hikes would be possible, or even
mandatory, or in which there are protections for collective bargaining
agreements.in But part of the appeal of a Chapter 9-modeled state
bankruptcy regime is as a partisan sword for Republicans in the tax-
hike versus spending-cut debate.
Rather than addressing the causes of state budget crises, state
bankruptcy proposals dangle the false hope of fiscal solutions to politi-
cal problems and offer cover for partisan agendas. Current state
bankruptcy proposals leave the root causes of state fiscal distress unad-
dressed, setting the stage for serial filings by states, much like the air-
line industry, where massive cuts in labor costs have not fixed a
tenuous business model heavily dependent on fuel costs and con-
sumer spending. 19 Whatever limited benefits state bankruptcy might
produce, it is wholly inadequate to address procyclical pressures on
state budgets that result from fiscal federalism's interaction with state
legal and political culture.20 How to reform the fiscal federalism ar-
rangement or states' legal and political cultures is a topic beyond the
scope of this Article, but that is where we must instead look to find
real solutions to state budget crises.
The shortcomings of state bankruptcy proposals illustrate the lim-
its of bankruptcy as a tool for dealing with debt problems. Under-
standing the limitations of bankruptcy helps define what bankruptcy
is, just as drawing the spaces around objects, rather than the objects
themselves, defines figures on a canvas. Objects can be defined not
only as what they are, but also as what they are not.
This Article uses state bankruptcy proposals as a window into
bankruptcy theory. The bankruptcy field is surprisingly underthe-
orized, with only one major attempt to create a unified theory of bank-
76 (alteration in original) (quoting a November 11, 2010 speech given by Newt Gingrich
before the Institute for Policy Innovation).
18 Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 283, 327-29 (2012) (proposing that bankruptcy courts be
allowed to impose tax increases in municipal bankruptcies in order to neutralize strategic
behavior of local officials).
19 IATA Economic Briefing: Airline Fuel and Labour Cost Share, INT'L AIR TRANSP. ASS'N
(Feb. 2010), http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Airline_Labour_
Cost_ShareFeb2010.pdf (breaking out fuel, labor, and aircraft rentals as the three major
real operating costs); Joe Brancatelli, The Sky Gods Can Smile (for Now), PORTFOLIO.COM
(Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.portfolio.com/business-travel/2010/08/04/airlines-positive-
earnings-reports-belie-dark-trends/ (noting the importance of business and leisure traffic
levels for airlines' revenues).
20 See Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REv. 187, 190 (2010) (noting
the procyclical fiscal pressures placed on states and the neglect of scholarly attention paid
to this problem).
1404 [Vol. 97:1399
BANKRUPT POLITICS
ruptcy. That attempt, emerging from the early law-and-economics
literature, has produced a contractarian understanding of bankruptcy
known as the "creditors' bargain." The creditors' bargain theory
posits that bankruptcy law should try to replicate the bargain that
creditors would have made themselves-a bargain that would necessa-
rily involve a maximization of returns.2' Despite numerous criticisms
of the creditors' bargain theory,22 no clear alternative unified theory
has emerged, and the creditors' bargain approach continues to domi-
nate the field, if simply for lack of competition.
This Article presents a first step toward a new theoretical under-
standing of bankruptcy law. It argues that contractarian and procedu-
ral approaches to bankruptcy are necessarily incomplete because they
do not account for the politics of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy law must be understood first and foremost from a po-
litical perspective. Bankruptcy is ultimately a distributional exercise,
rather than a system to maximize returns to creditors, and this charac-
teristic makes it inherently political. The shape of bankruptcy law is
an expression of distributional norms (of which the creditors' bargain
efficiency norm is but one) and interest group politics, rather than an
exercise in economic efficiency. Special interest provisions in bank-
ruptcy law are thus not a deviation but, like the rest of bankruptcy law,
simply an outcome of political bargaining. A proper theoretical un-
derstanding of bankruptcy must therefore commence from a political,
rather than economic, perspective.
This Article does not aim to present a full exposition of a new,
political theory of bankruptcy law. Instead, it lays out the initial
roadmap for a fuller exposition of bankruptcy as the "creditors' armi-
21 See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUrcy LAw 8-21
(1986) (setting forth basic principles of bankruptcy law and presenting bankruptcy as a
system of contracts between creditors); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping,
and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 831-33 (1987) (advocating for a
view of bankruptcy that would preserve in bankruptcy proceedings the rights and relations
creditors have outside of bankruptcy law); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 895 & n.173 (1982) ("As the credi-
tors' bargain model would suggest, [the] decision [of whether to proceed with liquidation
or reorganization] should be made on the basis of which form provides the greatest aggre-
gate dollar-equivalent return from the assets ...."). The emphasis on the wealth-max-
imization principle owes much to Richard Posner, who sets forth wealth maximization as
an ethical basis for social and economic organization. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OFJUSTICE passim (1981). It is never entirely clear whether the creditors' bargain principle
is normative or positive. While the creditors' bargain is a rationalization of current bank-
ruptcy law, its proponents have also identified numerous examples where current bank-
ruptcy law violates the maximization principle. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E.
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain,
75 VA. L. REV. 155, 156 (1989) ("[P]ersistent and systematic redistributional impulses are
apparent in bankruptcy.").
22 See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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stice"-namely that bankruptcy law represents a dynamic and often
messy political "armistice line" between competing interest groups.
Part I of this Article commences with a consideration of the ori-
gins and political economy of state budget crises. It emphasizes that
the interaction of the current fiscal federalism arrangement and the
peculiar political economy of state legislatures sets the stage for cycli-
cal budget crises. The U.S. fiscal federalism arrangement results in
unusual financial strains on the states during economic downturns,
while states' legal and political cultures constrain states' options for
dealing with downturns.
Part II examines how the instability in state budgets caused by
fiscal federalism metastasizes into budget crises due to a variety of po-
litical agency problems, including a moral hazard in state politics and
a lack of political resolve and consensus about the appropriate
response.
Part III explores the bankruptcy toolbox. It notes that traditional
rationales for bankruptcy are a poor fit for subnational governments
like states. Instead, another rationale emerges: bankruptcy as a politi-
cal tool. As a political tool, bankruptcy might be able to mitigate polit-
ical agency problems, but it could easily become a partisan weapon.
Irrespective, bankruptcy cannot fix the structural-political problem
underlying states' budgets any more than it can make a gas lamp
maker, cooper, cartwright, wainwright, wheelwright, or telegraph
transmitter manufacturer profitable. Bankruptcy is not a solution to
every debt problem.
Part IV steps back and asks what state bankruptcy proposals tell us
about bankruptcy law. It argues that state bankruptcy proposals show
the limits of contractarian approaches to bankruptcy law and that
bankruptcy must be viewed first and foremost through a political lens
because it is fundamentally a distributional exercise. In so doing, Part
IV takes a first step at sketching out a new political theory of bank-
ruptcy law.
I
FiscAL FEDERALISM AND STATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS
Every state has its idiosyncratic budget problems, but cyclical state
fiscal crises are the inevitable outcome of the interaction between fis-
cal federalism-the financial relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states-and states' legal and political cultures. The
current U.S. fiscal federalism arrangement is hardwired to create cycli-
[Vol. 97:13991406
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cal state financial distress. 23 The extent of this distress will vary among
states during cyclical downturns. States as a whole, however, cannot
escape budget crises during an economic downturn because of the
lopsided burdens placed on them by fiscal federalism. 24
Under the current fiscal federalism arrangement, states are sad-
dled with countercyclical Keynesian spending obligations-both ex-
plicit obligations and those implicit in the political compact-but lack
the Keynesian borrowing power required to support these obliga-
tions.25 The result of this structural mismatch is budget crises, as
23 See Galle & Klick, supra note 20 ("[State revenues are heavily] tied to the business
cycle, so that budgets get tighter just when the need for countercyclical spending
increases.").
24 See id. at 191 (suggesting ways in which the federal government could attempt to
combat this problem).
25 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY ch. 22 (1936) (describing the "Trade Cycle"); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Feder-
alism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2605-11 (2005) (discussing the pre-Keynesian nature of
state budgets).
It is instructional to compare the U.S. fiscal federalism arrangement with the Euro-
pean Union fiscal federalism arrangement. The Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU
vaguely mandates balanced budgets for the member states: "Member States shall avoid
excessive government deficits." Treaty on European Union art. G, art. 104(c)(1), Feb. 7,
1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 13 (hereinafter Maastricht Treaty). This is defined as a govern-
ment deficit to GDP ratio exceeding 3% and a government debt to GDP ratio exceeding
60%. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 279, Protocol (No
12), art. 1. There is little in the way of an enforcement mechanism. See Maastricht Treaty
art. 104. Instead, the provision is largely aspirational-in 2002, France and Germany were
the first states to breach the deficit ratios-but it might have a precatory effect that limits
member states' Keynesian borrowing powers. The Nine Lives of the Stability Pact: A Special
Report of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group, CTR. FOR EUR. POLICY STUDIES, 4 (2004), http:/
/www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/948.
The EU itself has neither Keynesian spending obligations nor Keynesian borrowing
power, and neither the EU nor member states are formally liable for each others' obliga-
tions. Maastricht Treaty art. 103. As a practical matter, however, this is no longer the case
because of the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)-which is able
to issue bonds guaranteed by European Area Member States (EAMS)-and the creation of
the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM)-which is able to issue debt guaran-
teed by the European Commission (EC) and collateralized by the EC's budget. See generally
About EFSF, EUR. FIN. STABILITY FACILITY, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm (last
visitedJuly 16, 2012) (describing the capabilities of the EFSF). OnJuly 11, 2011, the EAMS
signed a treaty creating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a rescue fund to replace
the EFSF and EFSM. Treaty Establishing European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Signed, EUR.
COMM'N (July 11, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/articles/financial_opera-
tions/2011-07-11-esm-treaty-en.htm. A modified version of the Treaty was signed on Feb-
mary 2, 2012. European Stability Mechanism Treaty Signed, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION (Feb.
2, 2012), http://consilium.europa.eu/homepage/showfocus?lang=en&focuslD=79757.
The EU does not itself engage in debt issuance (and has no legal mechanism for
doing so) and is subject to a strict annual balanced budget requirement. See Robert
Ackrill, The European Union Budget, the Balanced Budget Rule and the Development of Common
European Policies, 20 J. PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2000). The European Investment Bank provides
project finance, like the World Bank, for projects that further "the EU's policy objectives,"
rather than general funds, while the European Central Bank acts as a liquidity provider,
like the IMF or Federal Reserve, via its purchases of EU member government bonds, but
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states struggle to come up with spending cuts and tax hikes to close
their budget gaps.26
The states have Keynesian spending obligations because they are
the primary providers of many services to citizens, including educa-
tion, corrections, health care, disability, and unemployment bene-
fits. 27 Much of this spending is due to unfunded or partially funded
federal mandates-costs that the federal government formally or
functionally requires the states to incur.28
These federal mandates range from education to environmental
protection, but welfare and health care programs are the most expen-
sive. 29 Demand for welfare and state-funded health care is also cycli-
cal with the economy. For example, as unemployment rises, so too do
demands on the states for partially state-funded welfare benefits,30
such as unemployment insurance,31 Temporary Assistance to Needy
not as a Keynesian borrower, as it is a monetary, rather than fiscal, institution. See EMMAN-
UEL APEL, CENTRAL BANKING SYSTEMS COMPARED: THE ECB, THE PRE-EURo BUNDESBANK, AND
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 183 (2003); RENE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: INSTI-
TUTIONAL ASPECTS 269-72 (1997); About the FJB, EUR. INv. BANK, http://www.eib.org/
about/index.htm (last visited July 16, 2012).
26 See McNichol et al., supra note 1, at 1-3.
27 See id. at 7.
28 Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, enacted as part of the Con-
tract with America, a spending obligation is not a mandate if the federal law allows the
state to make up for the cost by reducing other facets of the activity. See Pub. L. No. 104-4,
§ 421(5), 109 Stat. 48, 51-52 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 658(5) (2006)) (defining "federal
intergovernmental mandate"). Neither Medicaid nor most other programs that play prom-
inent roles in state fiscal crises are mandates under this definition. Given political realities,
however, states cannot cut some programs-particularly those that are intergovernmental
programs-because the costs to the states would likely be higher if the states attempted to
provide the service alone. See Robert D. Behn & Elizabeth K. Keating, Facing the Fiscal Crises
in State Governments: National Problem; National Responsibilities 3-4 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov't, Harvard Univ., Research Working Paper No. 04-025, 2004), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=563162. I refer to these programs as "functional mandates."
29 There is no definitive costing of federal mandates nor is there a definition of "un-
funded mandate." See ROBERT JAY DILGER & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40957, UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT: HISTORY, IMPACT, AND ISSUES 4-12 (2011). The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget
puts out an annual cost-benefit analysis of executive agencies' regulations, but this analysis
does not cover preexisting mandates like Medicaid, which is generally regarded as the
largest single mandate and is the largest single item for states' budgets, comprising 22.3%
of states' expenditures in fiscal year 2010. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULA-
TIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2011); NASBO
2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 11.
30 See, e.g., Marshall J. Vest, Arizona Fiscal Issues: The Effects of the Economic Cycle on Gov-
ernment Revenue, ELLER COLL. OF MGMT. ECON. & Bus. RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 2009), http://
ebr.eller.arizona.edu/Arizona_fiscal-issues/economic-cyclicality%20-government-
revenues.asp.
31 Hannah Shaw & Chad Stone, Introduction to Unemployment Insurance, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-19-02ui.pdf
("States provide most of the funding and pay for the actual benefits provided to workers;
the federal government pays only the administrative costs."). While unemployment insur-
1408
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Families (TANF, the successor to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children),32 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program/Employ-
ment and Training (SNAP/ET, formerly known as the Food Stamp
Program),3 3 the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 3 4 and
most importantly, Medicaid, which accounted for 22.3% of state
spending in fiscal year 2010.3 5
Figures 1 through 3 below illustrate states' problems with
countercyclical expenses. As Figure 1 shows, total annual unemploy-
ment insurance benefit costs rose during and after every economic
downturn since 1980, but most dramatically in 2009.36 Figure 2 shows
total unemployment insurance benefits paid annually as a percentage
of states' annual aggregate gross revenue.37 Unemployment insur-
ance benefit payments spike at precisely the time when state revenues
decline, resulting in unemployment insurance benefit payments rising
from less than 2% to nearly 7% of state budgets. Figure 3 illustrates
the annual rate of growth of Medicaid expenditures. While Medicaid
expenditures have consistently increased for a variety of reasons, the
ance is collected into federal and state trust funds, neither has been immune from raids.
See, e.g., NJ Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Diverted Revenues, Low Balance Threaten Fund's
Health, N.J. POL'Y RES. ORG. FOUND. (2006), http://www.njprofoundation.org/pdf/ffd09
06.pdf. Moreover, state unemployment insurance trust funds will borrow from the federal
government. As of March 7, 2012, twenty-eight states and the Virgin Islands were borrow-
ing for their insurance trust funds. Unemployment Insurance: State Trust Fund Loans, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-
unemployment-trust-fund-loans.aspx (last updated July 13, 2012).
32 TANF is funded through federal block grants but requires matching state mainte-
nance of effort (MOE) funds in order to retain block grant eligibility. Forty-five percent of
TANF expenditures in fiscal 2010 were from state funds. NASBO 2010 REPORT, supra note
14, at 30.
33 The federal government directly funds the SNAP component of SNAP/ET, but the
states have a 50% matching contribution requirement for the ET component after they
exhaust a substantial grant of federal-only funds. See 7 U.S.C. § 2025(h) (1)-(3) (2006).
Many states contribute very little to ET even in good times. States do not appear to in-
crease ET spending in response to increased poverty or SNAP participation. The states
also share administrative costs for SNAP with the federal government. FOOD & NUTRITION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) STATE
ACTIviTy REPORT: FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 11 (2011), available at http://www.fns.usda.
gov/snap/qc/pdfs/2010_state-activity.pdf ("The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) pays
approximately 50 percent of State agency administrative costs to operate the [SNAP]
program.").
34 JOINT ECON. COMM., 1l0TH CONG., WORSENING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WILL IN-
CREASE DEMAND FOR THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM AND MEDICAID 1
(2008), available at http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/Ol.18.08%20CHIP
%20Medicare%2OReport.pdf.
35 NASBO 2010 REPORT, supra note 14, at 11 tbl.5. States are also vulnerable to
changes in federal budgeting. See Michael Cooper, No Matter How Debt Debate Ends, Gover-
nors See More Cuts for States, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at A8.
36 Falling unemployment insurance benefits in 2010 may represent the expiration of
unemployment benefits for many of the unemployed.
37 The discrepancy between the time series lengths in Figures 1 and 2 is because ag-
gregate state revenue data is not readily available before 1992.
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rate of growth still corresponds to economic cycles, spiking after the
economic downturns in 2001 and 2009.
FIGURE 1:
$80 
TOTAL ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS PAID
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38 EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
FINANCIAL DATA HANDBOOK, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/
hb394.asp (reporting column 10, benefits paid, not inflation adjusted). This chart
represents unemployment insurance benefit payments. The data does not account for
changes in the terms of unemployment insurance or the size of the eligible labor pool.
Instead, it is meant merely to show large countercyclical costs for states.
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FIGURE 2: TOTAL ANNUAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS PAID
AS % OF STATES' REVENUE
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39 Id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, HISTORICAL DATA
[hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU HISTORICAL DATA], available at http://www.census.gov//govs/
estimate/historicaldata.html (providing data from 1992 to 2008); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABLE 1. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND BY STATE:
2008-09, available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/estimate/09ssstabla.xls (providing
data for 2009).
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FIGURE 3: ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF MEDICAID EXPENDITURES 40
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States have three possible options when faced with budget
shortfalls: (1) increase spending by increasing revenue; (2) increase
spending by borrowing funds; or (3) cut costs by reducing services.
States face constraints on increasing both their revenue and their bor-
rowing, while reducing services risks exacerbating economic
downturns.
States have four major sources of revenue: (1) taxes; (2) federal
transfer payments; (3) charges (such as licensing and other fees, tui-
tion, and miscellaneous income); and (4) income from pension and
insurance trust fund investments. 41 While the breakdown varies by
state, for the fifty states in aggregate, taxes historically represent 43%
of revenue, federal transfers represent 23%, various charges represent
17%, and investment income represents 17%.42 States' revenue has
procyclical tendencies, as some types of tax, charges, and investment
income depend on the level of economic activity.
States have limited ability to control and increase their revenue.
Legal restrictions limit states' control over tax and charge revenue.
While states may set their tax rates and the level of charges, many
states also have constitutional tax limitations that constrain their abil-
40 NASBO 2010 REPORT, supra note 14 (providing thirteen different reports from
1998 to 2010). While the Medicaid program has changed during this period, the spikes in
growth rates are nonetheless apparent.
41 See CENSUS BuRE-Au HISTORIcAL DATA, supra note 39.
42 Id.
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ity to raise revenue. 43 Federal law too limits states' ability to raise reve-
nue, by restricting the type of transactions states may tax.
44
Economic factors also limit states' ability to increase tax and
charge revenue. Although states have an in-state monopoly on some
services (e.g., issuance of driver licenses for state residents) and are
generally not subject to market pressures in pricing the way private
firms might be, states are in theory subject to Laffer curve constraints
on their ability to tax and charge. The Laffer curve is the economic
theory positing that as tax rates rise, so too will tax revenue until the
taxation begins to discourage economic activity by rendering it insuffi-
ciently profitable relative to untaxed activities, such as leisure, at
which point higher tax rates will result in lower revenue. 45 In addi-
tion, a jurisdictional competition for residents can also limit a state's
ability to tax, as described by economist Charles Tiebout.4 6 Thus, if
taxes are too high, a state's tax base may shrink, either due to reduced
economic activity or fewer economic actors. 47
Moreover, some types of tax and charge revenues are inherently
procyclical, which complicates states' efforts to raise revenue in eco-
nomic downturns. Income and sales tax revenues, for example, are
likely to decline during a downturn if rates are held constant, as the
43 See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915-25 (2003); see also Bert Waisanen, State Tax and
Expenditure Limits-2008, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/budget/state-tax-and-expenditure-limits-2008.aspx (last visited July 14, 2012) (re-
viewing states' taxing and spending limitations).
44 Super, supra note 4, at 369. States cannot generally tax Internet sales absent a
sufficient nexus in the buyer's state. Cf Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301-02
(1992) (declaring that National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S.
753, 759-60 (1967), which requires an economic nexus for taxation, is still valid); STEVEN
MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41853, STATE TAXATION OF INTERNET TRANSACTIONS 1
(June 7, 2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41853.pdf (noting that
states are attempting to persuade Congress to change the law to require out-of-state retail-
ers to collect taxes from in-state purchasers). Federal law also limits states' ability to tax the
Internet and Internet transactions more broadly. See Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (establishing an initial Internet tax moratorium),
amended by Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-75, 115 Stat. 703
(extending the moratorium to 2003), amended by Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-435, 118 Stat. 2615 (extending the moratorium to 2007), amended by
Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024
(extending the moratorium to 2014).
45 Jude Wanniski, Taxes, Revenues, and the "Laffer Curve, "PUB. INr., Winter 1978, at 3,
3-5.
46 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-21
(1956).
47 But see Robert Tannenwald et al., Tax Flight Is a Myth: Higher State Taxes Bring More
Revenue, Not More Migration, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICv PRIORITIES, 1 (Aug. 4, 2011), http://
www.cbpp.org/files/8-4-llsfp.pdf (noting that tax increases have little impact on interstate
migration). This study does not disprove the Laffer curve or Tiebout competition, but
merely indicates that at current tax rates, citizens do not significantly migrate from high-
tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Id. at 15.
2012] 1413
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
revenue from these taxes depends on the level of economic activity.
Property tax revenue is also likely to decline, although it may lag be-
hind the business cycle because of outdated property valuations.
Charges may also suffer in downturns, as demand for certain types of
licenses or willingness to pay tuition may decrease during downturns.
And states may be reluctant to increase tax rates or charges in an eco-
nomic downturn both for political reasons and for fear of further
damaging the state economy. Thus, taxes and charges have limited
potential as countercyclical revenue.
States have even less control over federal transfer payments and
investment income. Federal transfer payments depend on federal
government policy and are generally not countercyclical, except at the
margin. Investment income is heavily dependent on the market and
is highly procyclical. States therefore have limited ability to increase
revenue when the demand for state services increases during eco-
nomic downturns.
Borrowing is a way of financing countercyclical spending, but
states' ability to do so is bound by self-imposed positive legal con-
straints. Unlike the federal government, every state except Vermont,
and arguably Wyoming, North Dakota, and Alaska 4 8-states both with
no history of deficits and with political cultures strongly opposed to
deficit spending-has a balanced budget requirement of some sort,49
48 Vermont lacks any sort of balanced budget requirement or related fiscal limitation.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS:
STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 & n.3 (1993) [here-
inafter GAO BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS]. Wyoming does not have an explicit bal-
anced budget requirement, but in practice it is required to balance, as Wyoming's
constitution generally prohibits the state from incurring debt beyond the current year's tax
revenue absent a popular vote, and it limits state debt other than for public defense or
suppression of insurrection to 1% of the assessed value of taxable property in the state.
WYo. CONsT. art. 16, §§ 1-2; GAO BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra.
North Dakota's constitution contains a general prohibition on debt and requires par-
tial matching of bond debts with revenues, but there is no explicit balanced budget re-
quirement. N.D. CONsT. art. X, § 13. North Dakota's executive budget officers, however,
consider themselves prohibited from running deficits. NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced
Budget Provisions, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 5 (Oct. 2010), http://www.
ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions20lO.pdf [hereinafter NCSL Fis-
cal Brie].
Alaska also does not have an explicit balanced budget requirement, but its constitu-
tion and statutes effectively require one. Id. at 2; see ALAKSA CONST. art. IX, § 8 (limiting
the incurrence of debt other than for defense and disasters to capital improvements and
housing loans for veterans and requiring voter ratification); id. § 10 (permitting borrowing
in anticipation of collection of revenues but requiring such debt to be repaid before the
end of the next fiscal year); ALASKA STAT. § 37.07.020 (2011) ("Proposed expenditures [by
the governor] may not exceed estimated revenue for the succeeding fiscal year.").
49 Peter R. Orszag, The State Fiscal Crisis: Why It Happened and What to Do About It,
MILKEN INST. REv., Third Quarter 2003, at 17, 21; INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, THE
TRUTH ABOUT BALANCED BUDGETS: A Fwrv STATE STUDY 25 (2009), available at http://state
budgetwatch.org/50_StateFinal.pdf. For a listing of the constitutional and statutory cita-
tions of state balanced budget requirements, see Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, A Framework
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although stringency varies.50 Most states also prohibit the carryover of
deficits51 and have debt limits of various types. 52
While states have found numerous ways to circumvent these re-
quirements, 53 the circumventions are at best short-term fixes.54 For
for Understanding State Balanced Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features
and an Operational Definition, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 2006, at 22, 31-33.
50 The major variations in balanced budget requirements are whether a balanced
budget must merely be proposed, whether a balanced budget must be passed, and whether
deficits can be carried over from budget to budget. NCSL Fiscal Brief supra note 48, at 2.
There is significant variation in state balanced budget requirements. In forty-four
states, the governor must submit a balanced budget. James M. Poterba & Kim S. Rueben,
Fiscal News, State Budget Rules, and Tax-Exempt Bond Yields, 50J. URB. ECON. 537, 547 (2001).
Only thirty-seven states, however, require the legislature to enact a balanced budget, but
revenues and expenditures may vary from it. Id. Six of these states require unexpected
deficits to be corrected the next fiscal year, while twenty-four prohibit deficits to be carried
forward. Id. at 547-48. This means that deficits can be run both in the states that only
require the submission of a gubernatorial budget (IL, LA, MA, NH, NV, NY) and in those
that do not require deficits to be accounted for in future budgets (AK, CA, CT, MD, MI,
PA, WI). See Steven M. Sheffrin, State Budget Deficit Dynamics and the California Debacle, 18J.
ECON. PERSP. 205, 206-07 (2004).
The federal government briefly had a balanced budget requirement. See Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038;
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-119, 101 Stat. 754. These Acts provided for automatic sequesters (spending cuts) if the
budget exceeded certain fixed deficit targets. The automatic sequesters were held to be
unconstitutional because their execution was delegated to the Comptroller General, a leg-
islative branch official. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986). Congress enacted a
revised version of the legislation in 1987, but the fixed deficit targets proved ineffective
and were supplanted by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388-573 (codified as amended throughout 2 U.S.C. and at 15 U.S.C. § 1022), which
instead imposes caps on annual appropriations and requires a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
budget-neutral process for changes in taxes and entitlements. These provisions have subse-
quently lapsed and been reinstated, and they have frequently been circumvented. The
'Paygo' Coverup, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at A12.
51 NCSL Fiscal Brief supra note 48 (identifying thirteen states that permit deficit carry-
overs); cf GAO BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS, supra note 48 (identifying twenty-one
states that permit deficit carryovers).
52 ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAw: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE § 4.2 (1992); see also Robert Krol, A Survey of the Impact of Budget Rules on
State Taxation, Spending, and Debt, 16 CATOJ. 295, 295 (1997) (counting twenty-three states
with tax or expenditure limitations).
.5-3 See INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, supra note 49, at 26-30 (detailing ways in
which states evade balanced budget requirements); see also Cheryl D. Block, Budget Gim-
micks, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY, supra
note 4, at 39, 39-63 (describing analogous gimmicks in the federal budget).
54 The empirical political-science literature shows that budgetary institutions influ-
ence fiscal policies. See, e.g., James E. Alt & Robert C. Lowry, Divided Government, Fiscal
Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States, 88 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 811, 823 (1994)
(finding that states with harder balanced budget rules react more promptly to revenue or
spending shocks); H. Abbie Erler, Legislative Term Limits and State Spending, 133 PUB.
CHOICE 479, 479-80 (2007) (finding higher state spending in states with legislative term
limits); Signe Krogstrup & Srbastien Walti, Do Fiscal Rules Cause Budgetary Outcomes?, 136
PUB. CHOICE 123, 134-35 (2008) (examining the impact of fiscal rules in Swiss subfederal
jurisdictions); James M. Poterba, Capital Budgets, Borrowing Rules, and State Capital Spending,
56J. POL. ECON. 165, 185 (1995); James M. Poterba, Do Budget Rules Work? 35-37 (Nat'l
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example, because states operate on cash budgets, 55 some states have
balanced their budgets by simply not paying obligations during a fiscal
year.56 The obligations remain due, however, and must eventually be
paid. Likewise, states have routinely raided their pension funds
(which are not subject to balanced budget requirements), but these
funds must ultimately be repaid if the state is to avoid defaulting on its
pension obligations. 57
In the end, these gimmicks only delay recognition of budget
problems and tend to worsen future budget crises. As a result, states
have limited ability to engage in long-term borrowing to meet current
expenses, and to the extent they can, law or tradition often limits
states' borrowing to capital projects. Because states are more likely to
initiate capital projects in flush times than in crises, this borrowing
ends up being procyclical. 58
The result is that states cannot engage in countercyclical Keyne-
sian deficit spending in order to stimulate the economy when private
sector spending falls off. Instead, when demands on the federally
mandated parts of states' budgets grow during economic downturns,
states must either raise taxes (subject to all the complications and limi-
tations previously discussed), cut nonmandated (i.e., discretionary)
spending-expenditures on state programs other than for existing
debts-or both.
Both responses are politically unpopular and economically
counterproductive. Both tax hikes and spending cuts exacerbate eco-
nomic downturns by reducing aggregate demand. 59 Higher taxes re-
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5550, 1996), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w5550; James M. Poterba, State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetay
Institutions and Politics, 102 J. POL. ECON. 799, 819 (1994) [hereinafter Poterba, State Re-
sponses]; Jirgen Von Hagen, A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints, 44
J. PUB. ECON. 199, 208-09 (1991) (finding that state budget rules affect the level and com-
position of state debts); see also Dale Bails & Margie A. Tieslau, The Impact of Fiscal Constitu-
tions on State and Local Expenditures, 20 CATO J. 255, 257-58 (2000) (discussing conflict in
political science literature between "public choice" and "institutional irrelevance" views of
state budget institutions).
55 INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACcOUNTING, supra note 49, at 26. Some states, like California,
have repeatedly shifted between cash and accrual budgeting based on what would provide
the easiest way to balance the budget. States also use accrual accounting selectively to
count future revenues or savings in their current budgets, but not future expenses. Id. at
28.
56 See infta text accompanying notes 106-07.
57 Public pension plans are not guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corpo-
ration. See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2) (2006).
58 Super, supra note 4, at 387-88 (discussing the issuance of revenue bonds at the
peak of the business cycle without accounting for future downturns).
59 Orszag, supra note 49, at 22.
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duce the funds citizens have to spend, thereby contributing to
economic contraction. 60
Similarly, spending cuts result in layoffs, cancelled contracts, re-
duced benefit payments, and lower payments to businesses and non-
profits that provide direct services. 61 Spending cuts mean that
citizens-either as direct-benefit recipients or as employees of the
state or affected firms-receive less money from the state and have
reduced consumption ability. In addition, many state expenditures
are tied to federal matching funds. Therefore, expenditure cuts re-
duce state services more than they reduce state costs. For example,
cutting a dollar of Medicaid expenses will only net a state between 12
and 44 cents of savings, but it will deny the state's residents a dollar's
worth of Medicaid covered services. 62 Thus, both tax increases and
spending cuts can exacerbate economic woes.
The combination of Keynesian countercyclical spending obliga-
tions without Keynesian borrowing capacity means that state budgets
are inevitably stressed during a national economic downturn. While
countercyclical spending need not be done at a deficit, it often is
done so in order to avoid tax hikes or spending cuts during economic
downturns. Balanced budget requirements are simply inconsistent
with deficit-financed countercyclical spending obligations. At the root
of states' budget troubles is a structural problem stemming from the
fiscal federalism arrangement, caused more by a mismatch between
spending duties and borrowing capacity than state overleverage.
This problem suggests a need to revisit the current fiscal federal-
ism arrangement. U.S. fiscal federalism has an insurance function
that provides a partial stabilizing safety net for states against asymmet-
60 Id. Both spending cuts and tax hikes might affect savings rates before consumption
levels, but given the low savings rate for most of the population, spending is likely to be
rapidly affected.
61 McNichol et al., supra note 1, at 7.
62 Jeremy Gerst & Daniel Wilson, Fiscal Crises of the States: Causes and Consequences, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (June 28, 2010), http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/let-
ter/2010/el2010-20.html. The basis of Gerst and Wilson's calculation is unclear. Under
permanent law, Medicaid's matching rate varies from 50% to just under 80%. Social Se-
curity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b, 1396d(b) (2006). The American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009 temporarily increased that rate, but that provision has expired. Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 5001 (a)-(b), 123 Stat. 115, 496-97. A higher rate-at least 75%-applies to
services funded through CHIP. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee. But in general, cutting Medicaid a
dollar should yield 20 to 50 cents to the state. See § 1396d(b).
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ric revenue shocks via tax and transfer flows. 63 It also accomplishes
significant interstate and interregional redistribution. 64
But with state income increasingly reliant on volatile capital mar-
kets, states simply cannot sustain both countercyclical federal spend-
ing mandates and balanced budget requirements. 65 Either states must
jettison their balanced budget requirements and be willing to engage
in deficit-funded countercyclical spending, making them true Keyne-
sian entities66 and giving real effect to their sovereignty, or they must
be recognized as mere administrative subdivisions of the federal gov-
ernment-a solution that would obligate federal spending to kick in
to fund federally mandated state obligations when the demand for
state services rises.6 7 Eliminating countercyclical federal spending
63 See, e.g., Tamim Bayoumi & Paul R. Masson, Fiscal Fows in the United States and Ca-
nada: Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe, 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 253, 264-65 (1995) (estimat-
ing a fiscal federalism stabilization effect of 30%); Charles A.E. Goodhart & Stephen
Smith, Stabilization, in THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNITY PUBLIC FINANCE 417 (Eur. Econ. Re-
ports & Studies No. 5, 1993) (estimating fiscal federalism stabilization effect of 13%); Ken-
neth Kletzer & JOrgen von Hagen, Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism, in THE IMPACr OF
EMU ON EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17, 20 tbl.2.1 (Charles Wyplosz ed.,
2001) (summarizing the literature's estimates for redistribution and insurance effects of
intranational transfers in the United States); Jacques M6litz & Frhderic Zumer, Regional
Redistribution and Stabilization by the Center in Canada, France, the UK and the US: A Reassess-
ment and New Tests, 86 J. PUB. ECON. 263, 279 (2002) (concluding that fiscal federalism
accounts for 10% of the regional stabilization in the United States); Xavier Sala-i-Martfn &
Jeffrey Sachs, Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United
States, in ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL BANK: ISSUES IN EUROPE AND LESSONS FROM THE US 195,
206-13 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et al. eds., 1992) (estimating that U.S. fiscal federalism
produces a combined short-term stabilization and long-term redistribution effect of 33 to
40%); Jurgen von Hagen, Fiscal Arrangements in a Monetary Union: Evidence from the US, in
FISCAL POLICY, TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED EU-
ROPE 337, 337-59 (Donald E. Fair & Christian de Boissieu eds., 1992) (estimating a fiscal
federalism stabilization effect of 10%).
64 See Kletzer & von Hagen, supra note 63 (summarizing estimates of the redistribu-
tion effect of U.S. fiscal federalism, ranging from 7 to 47%); von Hagen, supra note 63
(emphasizing the distinction between short-term stabilization and long-term redistribu-
tion). Relative to other fiscal federalism arrangements, the United States does not engage
in substantial interregional redistribution. German fiscal federalism has a complex, consti-
tutionally mandated redistribution requirement. See Ralf Hepp &Juirgen von Hagen, Fiscal
Federalism in Germany: Stabilization and Redistribution Before and After Unification 2-3
(Aug. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.fordham.edu/hepp/
vHH MZ02_Paper_2010_0830_web.pdf.
65 Noncylical federal spending mandates like environmental protection do not signifi-
candy worsen state fiscal troubles other than by taking some fraction of spending off the
table for cuts.
66 SeeSuper, supra note 4, at 367 (noting that "[s]tate fiscal policy.., has no analogue
to the notion that federal deficits and surpluses at different points in the business cycle can
help achieve macro-economic stability").
67 The federal government did toss a Keynesian bone to the states in the form of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (also known as "the stimulus"), mainly
in the form of increased Medicaid funding and a "State Fiscal Stabilization Fund." See Pub.
L. No. 111-5, §§ 14001-14012, 123 Star. 115, 279-286. That aid helped states weather
budget shortfalls in 2009 through 2011, but there are few funds remaining for disburse-
ment in 2012 and forward. McNichol et al., supra note 1, at 7-8.
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mandates would not solve all state budget problems. States would still
have a problem of cyclical revenue and noncyclical spending activities.
Eliminating countercyclical spending obligations, however, would
greatly mitigate state budget stress during downturns.
Put differently, to limit the severity of state budget crises, it is nec-
essary to either (1) eliminate unfunded, countercylical federal spend-
ing mandates (basically either requiring federal funding of state-
administered programs or relieving states of these obligations); (2)
allow the states to piggyback on the federal government's Keynesian
borrowing power; or (3) eliminate state balanced budget require-
ments (a particularly dangerous idea given the numerous political
economy problems that encourage deficits, as discussed below). 68
States' current sovereignty limbo is a fail-safe recipe for fiscal crises in
economic downturns. Without resolving fiscal federalism's conun-
drum, states are left with the hard task of choosing what taxes to raise
and what services to cut.
II
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE BUDGETS
While state budget crises ultimately have structural roots in fiscal
federalism, they are exacerbated by a moral hazard in state politics.
State legislatures and governors do not bear the full cost of their
budgetary decisions and are therefore incentivized to engage in risk-
ier fiscal management than they would otherwise. The result is to am-
plify the cyclicality of state budget crises that already exists due to
fiscal federalism.
A. Budget Deficits and Budget Crises
To understand the moral hazard in state budget politics, it is first
necessary to differentiate state budget crises from budget gaps. A
68 Balanced budget rules are a way of addressing politically induced inefficiencies, as
they force greater fiscal discipline. Balanced budget rules are also both a commitment and
a signaling device. They increase credibility with creditors, who know that future discre-
tionary spending will be cut or future revenue increased in order to pay the obligations
owed to them. Balanced budget rules also serve as a type of deductible that mitigates the
moral hazard of states counting on a federal bailout. If states have to first make the expen-
diture cuts or tax increases to balance their budget before turning to the federal govern-
ment for assistance, they might be less likely to see federal bailouts as attractive insurance
for unwise profligacy. But they come at the price of loss of ability to engage in fiscal stabili-
zation over the economic cycle. See JONATHAN A. RODDEN, HAMILTON'S PARADox: THE
PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 147 (2006); Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S.
Kumar, Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All That: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokes-
creens?, in BANCA D'ITALIA, PUBLIC FINANCE WAORKSHOP, FISCAL POLICY: CURRENT ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES 479, 603-08 (2007), available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/studiricerche/
convegni/atti/fiscal-policy/Session% 203/Session 3FiscalPolicy-andBudgetary_
Institutions.pdf.
2012] 1419
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
budget gap is only a budget crisis if the budget must be balanced in an
acute timeframe. Running a deficit is not, in and of itself, a budget
crisis. A budget gap may become a crisis, however, when the legal
constraints that limit deficit financing force states to choose between
increasing revenue and cutting services in order to close the budget
gap. State budget crises arise from the inability (or more precisely,
unwillingness) of state legislatures to choose from the unappetizing
menu of tax hikes and service cuts necessary to close budget gaps.
The problem, then, has two elements: legal constraints on deficit fi-
nancing and political dysfunction inhibiting states' ability to close
budget gaps via increases in revenue or cuts in services. State budget
crises are about the unappealing political choices involved in closing
budget gaps, rather than any inherently insurmountable financial
problem in doing so.
States have greater ability than firms to increase revenue or cut
expenses. States can increase revenue by raising taxes (subject only to
the Laffer curve) and can cut services without losing revenue or ceas-
ing operation. This means that states are generally capable of balanc-
ing their budgets if they have the political moxie to increase taxes, cut
services and benefits, or both. 69 Politically, however, state legislators
have few incentives to pursue fiscal responsibility.
B. Political Agency Problems
A vast political economy literature has produced several theoreti-
cal explanations for why governments run budget deficits. 70 These
explanations include tax rate smoothing, common pool problems and
budgetary institutions, strategic deficits, intergenerational redistribu-
tion, delay due to distributional conflicts, and opportunistic politi-
cians exploiting voters' fiscal myopia. Not all of these theories easily
apply to U.S. states, given the legal constraints on running long-term
deficits, although the theories are not without relevance, given states'
numerous creative circumventions of balanced budget rules. 71 In ad-
dition to these theories, this Article suggests an additional explanation
of states' budget problems: a political moral hazard due to the weak-
ness of electoral discipline on spending decisions. All of these theo-
ries imply some form of political agency problem exacerbating state
fiscal distress.
69 See Gillette, supra note 18, at 1-2 (detailing municipal unwillingness to raise taxes
or decrease services when confronted with budget crises).
70 For an excellent overview of the theoretical literature on budget deficits, see Al-
berto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, The Political Economy of Budget Deficits, 42 INT'L MONETARY
FUND STAFF PAPERS 1, 1 (1995).
71 See sources cited supra note 53.
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1. Tax Rate Smoothing
One explanation for budget deficits is that they are used to en-
sure intertemporal smoothing of tax rates.72 If a state's expenses are
high in time period one (T1), but will be low in time period two (T 2 ),
a balanced budget approach would imply high taxes in T, and low
rates in T 2. If the state is seeking to smooth tax rates though, it will
run a deficit in TI, which it will pay off with the surplus in T2. In so
doing, it will minimize the distortional effect of taxes. This is not nec-
essarily a political agency problem-politicians may be carrying out
exactly what their constituents want-yet it could also easily reflect
political agency problems if risk-averse politicians seek to engage in
tax rate smoothing so as to avoid tax increases that could affect their
reelection chances (and the private benefits that come with elected
service).
2. Common Pool Problems and Budgetary Institutions
Another explanation of budget deficits portrays state legislatures
with geographically based representation as suffering from a common
pool problem. Individual legislators and committees fully internalize
the benefits of their spending decisions (generally focused on their
districts), but they bear only a fraction of the total cost, which is
spread out over the entire legislature.73 Similarly, when budgetary au-
thority is dispersed, such as through multiple committees, spending
72 RobertJ. Barro, On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87J. POL. ECON. 940, 940-41
(1979).
73 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassi-
cal Approach to Distributive Politics, 89J. POL. ECON. 642, 654, 658-62 (1981) (describing the
"Law of 1/n," which theorizes that spending increases with the number of legislators).
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also increases. 74 Thus, centralized or decentralized budget processes
matter.
75
3. Strategic Deficits
State budget problems could also be the result of the strategic
political use of debt-either to provide cover for spending cuts or to
tie future governments' hands. Ronald Reagan's budget director
David Stockman coined the term "strategic deficit" to describe an ad-
ministration policy of running up deficits in order to provide cover for
cutting social programs.7 6 Several political economics articles have
modeled a Stackelberg game 7 7 in which the party in office runs up
debt in order to limit the spending options of its successors, who
would be saddled with the debt service. 78 The appeal of such a strat-
74 See, e.g., John F. Cogan, The Dispersion of Spending Authority and Federal Budget Defcits,
in THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 16, 17 (John F. Cogan et al.
eds., 1994) (suggesting that the most important reason for continuous federal budget defi-
cits after World War II was that jurisdiction over expenditures shifted from a centralized
congressional committee structure to a decentralized structure). There is a vast literature
on how the organization of legislatures leads to inefficient fiscal decisions. See, e.g.,JOHN A.
FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION, 1947-1968, at 1-12
(1974) (explaining how a decentralized legislative structure promotes economically ineffi-
cient decision making); David P. Baron &John A. Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures, 83
Am. POL. SoC. REV. 1181, 1183-86 (1989) (suggesting that members of the legislature act
noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own district); Morris P. Fiorina &
Roger G. Noll, Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of
Bureaucracy, 9 J. PuB. ECON. 239, 251-53 (1978) (explaining that when a demand for a
public good surges, incumbent legislators will engage in economically inefficient projects if
they are seeking reelection); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Political Preferences for
the Pork Barrel: A Generalization, 25 Am. J. POL. ScI. 96, 107-10 (1981) (showing that eco-
nomically inefficient projects can be politically popular); Weingast et al., supra note 73.
75 There are clearly limitations to the power of a common pool explanation of budget
gaps. The mismatch between costs and benefits only applies to projects that are particular
to individual legislative districts-for example, the construction of a new bridge. These
localized benefits are a fairly small part of state budgets. For program expansions, such as
Medicaid, corrections, or higher education, most legislative districts get a fraction of the
spending and bear a fraction of the costs. Even if there were a mismatch between costs and
benefits for legislative districts in most or all of state spending, it would only explain an
increase in spending, not a deficit itself (i.e., the failure to pay for the increased spending)
as the costs of a tax increase, just like the costs of financing a deficit, would be amortized
over all legislative districts, even if the benefits were limited to some.
76 Greg Anrig, "Strategic Deficit" Redux, Am. PROSPECT, Jan. 26, 2010, http://prospect.
org/article/strategic-deficit-redux-0 (discussing Reagan budget director David Stockman's
concept of strategically running deficits to provide cover for cutting social programs).
77 In a Stackelberg game, one player, the "leader," moves first, followed sequentially
by other players, the "followers," who can observe the leader's action. This gives the leader
an inherent advantage because the leader's move limits the followers' options and the
leader knows this. See generally HEINRICH VON STACKELBERG, MARKET STRUCTURE AND EQUI-
LIBRIUM (Damien Bazin et al. trans., Springer 2011) (1934) (introducing the Stackelberg
Leadership Model).
78 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and
Government Debt, 57 REv. ECON. STUD. 403, 412-13 (1990) (modeling an economy com-
prised of two parties that disagree about spending priorities but not spending levels, where
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egy increases with the chance that the opposition will prevail in the
next election.
Even in states with minimal partisan competition, strategic defi-
cits (to the extent that balanced budget rules can be circumvented)
may make sense in the presence of term limits. Running a large defi-
cit increases officeholders' popularity while sticking future officehold-
ers with the bill. The result is to increase the popularity and legacy of
the incumbents who may aspire to higher office.
4. Intergenerational Redistribution
Budget deficits can result from attempts at intergenerational re-
distribution, as the present generation spends and passes the bill on
to the future generation (assuming no Ricardian equivalence). 79
Again, this redistribution alone does not create a budget crisis unless a
balanced budget requirement also exists or the debt burden from the
intergenerational redistribution becomes unmanageable.
In the case of states, intergenerational redistribution is a one-way
ratchet, as there is no viable means to pass a surplus along to a future
generation. While states can accumulate surplus revenues in their
general fund balance or pay into a "rainy day" fund, not all have such
a fund,8 0 and those that do are not secure against political raids when
the need is not dire (leaky buckets). Moreover, some states' balanced
budget requirements do not permit deficits to be financed by the
both parties are encouraged to issue debt strategically); Roland Hodler, Elections and the
Strategic Use of Budget Deficits, 148 PuB. CHOICE 149, 158-59 (2011) (introducing a model in
which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending strategically runs
a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public
spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection); Torsten Persson &
Lars E.O. Svensson, Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsis-
tent Preferences, 104 Q.J. ECON. 325, 339-42 (1989) (modeling two parties that disagree
about spending levels, but not priorities, which encourages the low-spending party to issue
debt to constrain the high-spending party in the future); Guido Tabellini & Alberto
Alesina, Voting on the Budget Deficit, 80 Am. ECON. REV. 37, 47-48 (1990) (concluding that
under certain conditions, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium and a majority of
the voters favors a budget deficit); see also Stijn Goemmine & Carine Smolders, Strategic Use
of Debt in Flemish Municipalities, 10 B.E.J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 1-7 (2010) (reviewing
literature and theories on strategic deficits).
79 See, e.g., Alex Cukierman & Allan H. Meltzer, A Political Theory of Government Debt
and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework, 79 Am. ECON. REV. 713 passim (1989) (demonstrat-
ing how individual preference for positive debt induced by bequest constraints influences
intergenerational redistribution). Ricardian equivalence is a theory that total demand in
an economy is unaffected by government's decision to finance spending via debt or taxa-
tion as consumers internalize governmental budget constraints. See generallyJohnJ. Seater,
Ricardian Equivalence, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 142 (1993) (explaining Ricardian
equivalence).
80 Arkansas, Kansas, and Montana lack rainy day funds. Kim Rueben & Carol Rosen-
berg, State and Local Tax Policy: What Are Rainy Day Funds and How Do They Work ?, TAx
POLICY CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/state-local/fiscal/rainy-day.
cfm (last updated Aug. 12, 2009).
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rainy day fund.8 1 Functionally, most states maintain rainy day funds at
levels that cannot meaningfully cushion even small economic down-
turns; as of fiscal year 2008, only eight states had rainy day funds that
exceeded 10% of the states' annual expenditures.
8 2
5. Wars of Attrition
Budget deficits can also be the result of political stalemates or
"wars of attrition"-the delay in dealing with fiscal shocks caused by
conflicts between social groups or political parties regarding alloca-
tion of the costs (i.e., higher taxes or decreased expenditures) of bal-
anced budgets.83 In divided governments, wars of attrition can be a
particular problem. But even in coalition governments in which all
parties want a balanced budget, deficits can result because the de-
mands of maintaining a coalition require all parties to accede to the
others' partisan spending interests that predominate over balanced
budget interests. 84
6. Fiscal Illusion and the Political Business Cycle
The persistence of budget deficits in modern democracies has
been a central theme in public choice scholarship.8 5 The public
choice literature has argued that public deficits are the result of voters
suffering from a "fiscal illusion," namely that voters overestimate the
benefits of current expenditures and underestimate future tax bur-
dens when analyzing deficit-financed expenditures.8 6 Opportunistic
politicians seeking reelection for their personal benefits exploit this
misapprehension by raising spending more than taxes to curry favor
with the "fiscally illuded" voters.8 7 Accordingly, countercyclical spend-
ing itself contributes to excessive deficits because of its asymmetric
application. Politicians will run deficits in a recession but not sur-
81 Id. ("Some states allow withdrawals for any purpose deemed appropriate by the
governor or the state legislature, whereas others allow withdrawals only if the deficit is due
to a revenue shortfall, and others only if it is caused by unexpected expenditures.").
82 Id.
83 Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, Why Are Stabilizations Delayed, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
1170, 1171 (1991).
84 See Fabrizio Balassone & Raffaela Giordano, Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments,
106 PUB. CHOICE 327, 328 (2001).
85 See, e.g.,JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOG-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 31-39 (1962),
86 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL
LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 128-30 (1977); Richard E. Wagner, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion,
and Budgetary Choice, 25 PUB. CHOICE 45, 47 (1976). The fiscal-illusion argument curiously
presages behavioral economics in its emphasis on systematic overestimation of benefits and
underestimation of costs by voters (consumers). Strangely, behavioral economics is associ-
ated with progressive political thought in consumer finance, but fiscal illusion is associated
with conservative (or libertarian) thought in public finance.
87 See BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 86, at 129-30; Wagner, supra note 86, at 47.
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pluses when the recession ends because fiscally illuded voters reward
this behavior.88 While the fiscal illusion argument has limited applica-
tion to states because of their legal limitations on deficit financing, it
does help explain why states might spend profligately in T1, namely as
an underestimation of the costs to be paid in T2.
A related explanation for deficits can be found in the literature
on the political business cycle. While this literature has developed
parallel to the public choice literature, its explanation is rather simi-
lar: deficits are the result of politicians following expansionary policies
in election years in order to curry favor with voters who do not recog-
nize the future price tag of these policies.89 Both the public choice
and the political business cycle literatures emphasize politicians ex-
ploiting voter myopia.90 But voter myopia is hardly necessary given
the frictions that exist in electoral systems; elections offer imperfect
discipline on politicians' choices on any particular issue, as discussed
below.
7. Political Moral Hazard
In addition to previously discussed, nonexclusive explanations of
state budget deficits in the political economy literature, this Article
adds an additional, original explanation. This Article argues that even
if voters are not fiscally illuded, state spending is skewed by a political
moral hazard problem, as voting exercises very imperfect discipline on
budgets. The problem starts in good times, before there is a budget
crisis. When coffers are flush, states, like firms, face a dual tempta-
tion. They can lower taxes and return the surplus to citizens
(equivalent to a firm dividending retained earnings91 ) or they can
88 Charles K. Rowley, The Legacy of Keynes: From the General Theory to Generalized Budget
Deficits, in DEFICITS 143, 165-68 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1987).
89 See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Jeffrey Sachs, Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the
United States, 1948-1984, 20 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 63, 63 (1988); Alberto Alesina,
Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies, 8 ECON. PoLy 55, 55 (1989); Andre Blais
& Richard Nadeau, The Electoral Budget Cycle, 74 PuB. CHOICE 389, 389 (1992); Mala Lalvani,
Elections and Macropolicy Signals: Political Budget Cycle Hypothesis, 34 EcON. & POL. WKLY.
2676, 2681 (1999) (finding in India a reallocation of resources around election time to
expenditure categories that would help capture votes); C. Duncan MacRae, A Political
Model of the Business Cycle, 85J. POL. ECON. 239, 239-40 (1977); William D. Nordhaus, The
Political Business Cycle, 42 REv. ECON. STUD. 169, 187 (1975); Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sib-
ert, Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles, 55 REv. ECON. STUD. 1, 1 (1988); Kenneth Rog-
off, Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 21, 21 (1990). But seeAdi Brender
& Allan Drazen, How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evi-
dence from a Large Panel of Countries, 98 AM. ECON. REv. 2203, 2203-04 (2008) (finding no
evidence that deficits help reelection independent of other factors and finding that deficits
actually reduce reelection prospects in developed countries).
90 See Rogoff, supra note 89, at 21, 33.
91 Dividends that render a firm insolvent can be recovered as fraudulent transfers.
Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
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spend on more discretionary projects (equivalent to a firm reinvesting
its surplus).
However, both the tax cuts/dividends and spending/reinvesting
routes can be seen as forms of betting on risky projects. If successful,
they will yield big payoffs politically and financially. One route bets
on low taxes producing the political payoff without state budget trou-
bles. Thus, if taxes are cut and the state's budget holds firm, tax-cut-
ting politicians will reap political benefits.
The other route bets on state spending producing the political
payoff without state budget troubles. Thus, if the state engages in
more discretionary spending, there too is upside for politicians in the
form of patronage employment, benefit transfers, and general good-
will.92 Accordingly, in good times, states have locked themselves into
long-term obligations, such as generous collective bargaining agree-
ments. 93 While the details of these bets differ, the basic substance of
both gambles is the same, namely that using rather than saving the
surplus will bring political gain and will not result in a future shortfall.
The upside of undisciplined fiscal behavior, either through
spending/reinvesting or tax cuts/dividends is quite similar for states
and firms. But states face very different downsides than firms. If a
firm spends profligately, its share price will plummet, and the firm will
become a takeover target or even end up in bankruptcy, where cur-
rent equity owners will likely be wiped out and management replaced.
In contrast, state legislatures and governors face much less electo-
ral discipline for fiscal profligacy. Electoral discipline is weaker in this
context than market discipline. Elections take place at regularly
scheduled intervals, which mutes their ability to provide a dynamic
response to elected officials' current actions. Elections also typically
present voters with binary choices between candidates. Voters then
cast their votes based on many factors, with state budget gaps being
only one, and candidates' stances on fiscal issues might be outweighed
by their stances on social issues, for example. Moreover, blame for
budget problems is often shared among multiple politicians, elections
are staggered (like those for many corporate boards) , 94 and many
state legislators are elected from what are effectively "rotten bor-
oughs," "gerrymanders," or "safe seats" in which there is no electoral
1491, 1496-97 (1987). There is no indication that this would be the case with state tax
cuts.
92 Lowering taxes or increasing services conditions citizens to expect low taxes or
high services, which makes it politically harder to unwind these entitlements when there is
a budget gap.
93 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, In Connecticut, Affluent Image but Fiscal Pain, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2011, at Al.
94 Query whether the increasing (but still rare) use of recall elections may create
more electoral discipline.
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competition. The resulting mismatch between strong upside benefits
and limited downside costs encourages state legislators and governors
to be undisciplined with budgets and gamble large in good times.
The tendency to gamble via tax cuts or increased discretionary
spending in good times is itself exacerbated by the procyclical nature
of a major state obligation-pensions. Most state pension plans are
defined-benefit plans, meaning that the state is responsible for any
shortfall between the market return on employee contributions to the
plan and the promised benefit.95 Thus, the state assumes the risk of
investment performance on pension plan assets. If the stock market is
up-as it tends to be during boom times-state pension obligations
look well funded. When the market falls, however, state pension fund-
ing obligations increase at precisely the time that other demands on
the state budget increase.
A similar story plays out with state insurance trust funds. States
hold funds in trust to pay unemployment insurance and workers'
compensation claims. These funds are invested, making them highly
cyclical. Indeed, as Figure 4 shows below, for the fifty states collec-
tively, state revenue fluctuations are primarily the result of fluctua-
tions in insurance and pension fund revenue. (A similar picture exists
if local government revenue is included.)
95 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, ISSUE
BRIEF: WHY HAVE DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS SURVIVED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR? 3 fig.l (2007),
available at http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Why-have-db-plans-survived.pdf
(reporting that 92% of state and local employees in 2005 had defined-benefit pension
plans).
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FIGURE 4: STATE REVENUE FLUCTUATIONS 9 6
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A consequence of this political economy is that states have lim-
ited political ability to accumulate rainy day funds. If a state runs a
surplus, there are inevitable demands for taxes to be lowered, services
to be increased, or both. While a state may be able to hold on to some
of the surplus in a rainy day fund, constituent demands on politicians
and the politicians' desire to please constituents will limit the state's
ability to save. 9 7
C. The Political Economy of Budget Crisis Responses
Once a budget crisis emerges, meaning that a budget gap must
be closed within a limited window, the moral hazard becomes a temp-
tation to "gamble on resurrection" in various forms, where states
count on their finances improving on their own over time. There are
four manifestations of such resurrection gambling.
First, state legislatures may simply dither and delay in the hopes
that the economic climate will change or that something will turn up.
For example, if state revenue derives heavily from sales taxes, special
96 CENSUS BuREAu HISTORICAL DATA, supra note 39. Figure 4 does not show the
increase in federal transfer payments to states under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, as these would be reflected only
starting with 2010 revenue for the states.
97 Reforms to the fiscal federalism arrangement that encourage states to save
countercyclically could be very beneficial. For example, federal matching funds could en-
courage state savings. See William J. Baumol, Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The
Anatomy of Urban Crisis, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 415, 426 (1967) (suggesting the need for federal
support for cities); cf Robert P. Inman, Dissecting the Urban Crisis: Facts and Counterfacts, 32
NAT'L TAx J. 127, 136-37 (1979) (proposing countercyclical revenue sharing).
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excise taxes, income taxes, federal grants-in-aid, or even property
taxes, delay lets the legislature gamble on the possibility that eco-
nomic activity, federal funding, or property values will go up and thus
that revenue will increase without an increase in the tax rate.
Dither and delay, however, is not always the result of a rational
gamble, but often the result of political deadlock between those who
would raise taxes and those who would reduce spending.98 The in-
ability to decide between these options-a type of Buridan's ass prob-
lem-only exacerbates matters. 99
Second, state legislatures will be tempted to "borrow" from
reserves designated for unmatured future obligations, such as pen-
sions, in order to meet current expenses (a process known as "sweep-
ing"). In borrowing from these reserves, legislatures hope that
adequate funding for those future obligations will materialize some-
how. Doing so, however, creates a backdrop for a future crisis as the
maturity of those now-underfunded future obligations approaches.
Indeed, because pension funds are typically raided during an eco-
nomic downturn when their market value is depressed,100 the damage
to the funds is exacerbated by the loss of future market appreciation
on the raided funds. Selling depreciated assets locks in the losses so
that the pension funds cannot benefit in future market upswings.
Pension obligations are not included in states' general funds and
thus are not subject to states' balanced budget requirements, which
generally apply to states' general funds and some specific funds.101
State pension plans are not subject to ERISA, 10 2 meaning that nothing
forces states to fund their plans. Instead, states are able to determine
when they fund their pension plans, resulting in underfunded pen-
sion liabilities in lean times-a form of implicit borrowing against fu-
ture revenues.103
98 See Alt & Lowry, supra note 54, at 811; Poterba, State Responses, supra note 54, at
816-18; see also Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Government Spending and Budget Deficits
in the Industrial Countries, 4 ECON. POL'v 99, 126-27 (1989) (describing the same political
deadlock in regards to budgetary policy for OECD countries); Nouriel Roubini &Jeffrey D.
Sachs, Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, 33
EUR. ECON. REv. 903, 930-31 (1989) (same).
99 Buridan's ass found itself at a point equidistant from a pail of water and a stack of
hay. Because the ass could not decide which way to go, it ended up dying of hunger and
thirst. See Sharon M. Kaye, Why the Liberty of Indifference Is Worth Wanting: Buridan's Ass,
Friendship, and Peter John Olivi, 21 HIST. PHIL. Q. 21, 21 (2004).
100 SeeJ. Fred Giertz, The Impact of Pension Funding on State Government Finances, 29 ST.
TAX NOTES 507, 511 (2003).
101 See id. at 507-11.
102 See Barbara A. Chaney et al., The Effect of Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget Requirements
on the Funding and Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J. Accr. & PUB. POL'Y 287, 288
(2002).
103 See Giertz, supra note 100. It is important to distinguish, however, between total
pension funding obligations and those that mature in any given year. Even if a pension
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Third, state legislatures will be tempted to make overoptimistic
assumptions about the budgetary impacts of service cuts, tax rate in-
creases, or future market returns. As a result, service cuts and tax in-
creases will not be large enough to put the state on sound financial
footing, and the issue will have to be reexamined, thereby extending
the crisis and potentially reigniting the issue as soon as midyear
budget performance data is reported.
Fourth, states have resorted to accounting tricks to delay the un-
pleasant choice between tax hikes and spending cuts. These tricks
only defer the recognition of problems rather than eliminate them.
All fifty states operate on cash rather than accrual budgets. 1°4 Cash
accounting means that the budget reflects outlays and receipts, which
track when funds are actually paid or received, as opposed to reflect-
ing expenses and revenues, which track when goods or services are
actually used.105 In other words, accrual budgeting tracks costs in-
curred today but not payable until the future.
Cash budgeting allows states to play tricks with their accounting.
(Unfortunately, the alternative, accrual accounting, is equally, if not
more, problematic in this regard.) In its crudest form, cash account-
ing lets states balance budgets by stiffing creditors. As an example,
NewJersey balanced its budget by simply not paying $3 billion in obli-
gations.10 6 The state still owed those obligations, however, and had to
address them in the 2010 budget. Similarly, Illinois did not pay $3.8
billion in obligations from 2010.107
Cash budgeting also allows a state to improve its financial picture
for a current budget year through borrowing. The borrowed funds
are received in the budget year and are counted as receipts, whereas
the debt service payments will be outlays, but in future years. Thus,
plan is underfunded, it may not matter in terms of having sufficient assets and liquidity to
make current payments. Thus, a cyclically sensitive pension funding system may not be a
particular concern as long as it produces sufficient assets to meet obligations as they come
due.
As most state pension plans are defined benefit, rather than defined contribution, the
state is responsible for the difference between the investment return on the employee
contribution and the promised benefit. See id. at 507-11. The result is that state finances
are cyclically linked to stock market performance, so states are also implicitly betting on
future above-average stock market returns when they underfund their plans. See id.
104 See David Crane, (Not) Accounting for State Governments, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2011,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-01-19/opinion/27036398-1-general-fund-debt-
affordability-report-credit-card; INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, supra note 49, at 26.
Some states, like Illinois, have repeatedly shifted between cash and accrual budgeting
based on what would provide the easiest way to balance the budget. See id. at 28. States
also use accrual accounting selectively to count future revenues or savings in their current
budgets, but not future expenses. Id.
105 See Crane, supra note 104.
106 See id.
107 Michael Cooper, States' Money Woes Show No Favorites, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at
A12.
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states are effectively able to borrow against the future through an ac-
counting trick, despite balanced budget requirements. There is a
limit to the usefulness of this trick, however, as too much current fis-
cal-year borrowing will result in higher debt service in the future. 08
Likewise, cash accounting encourages states to enter into sale-
leasebacks of state property, whereby the state books the sale revenue
from the privatization in the current year but books lease payments
into the future. 10 9 Sale-leasebacks are functionally secured loans. The
same is true for future-flow securitization. States have securitized fu-
ture revenue such as tobacco settlement payments in order to book it
immediately. " 0o
Cash accounting also fuels the moral hazard in state politics be-
cause it shields states from recognizing the costs of current spending
decisions that will not be paid until the future. Cash accounting cre-
ates spending ability today while shifting the pain of repayment into
the future. For example, cash accounting has allowed states to pay
their employees more in the form of deferred benefits (such as pen-
sions), as these deferred benefits do not appear in the current budget,
meaning that states do not have to raise taxes to pay for the benefits at
the time they promise them."' Politicians receive immediate pa-
tronage benefits from the costs being deferred to future budgets.
Cash accounting thus allows politicians to reap the benefits of spend-
ing now and leave the costs to their successors, a particularly appeal-
ing route for politicians who hope to be upwardly mobile."12
Unfunded mandates and balanced budget requirements create a
structurally untenable basis for state budgets. State political econom-
ics create a moral hazard that exacerbates this structural problem.
108 See Super, supra note 4, at 376-77 (noting gimmickry as a "prominent feature of
states' response to fiscal crises").
109 See INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, supra note 49, at 29 ("[Sale-leasebacks] have
had the effect of dramatically improving the budget deficit while increasing future govern-
mental expenditures .... ).
110 See Behn & Keating, supra note 28, at 7. Municipalities like Chicago have engaged
in similar transactions by selling municipal revenue streams such as parking meters or the
Chicago Skyway toll road. See ToNY DUTZIK FT AL., ILL. PIRG EDUC. FUND, PRIVATIZATION
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHICAGO'S
PUBLIC ASSET LEASE DEALS 1 (2009), available at http://www.illinoispirg.org/sites/pirg/
files/reports/ Privatization-and-the-Public-In terest.pdf; Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the
Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1965, 1993-99 (2011).
III See INST. FOR TRUTH IN ACCOUNTING, supra note 49, at 26 ("[C] ash basis budgeting
ignores the effects of [pension obligations] .... ).
112 Cash accounting is not the only way states circumvent balanced budget require-
ments. Balanced budget requirements do not always apply to the entire state budget.
Sometimes they only apply to the general fund or to the general fund and to some but not
all specific funds. This allows "sweeps" whereby states transfer money from noncovered
funds to balance the budget in the general fund by claiming the transferred money as
"revenue," although the transfer is no more revenue than a transfer of funds from an
individual's savings account to a checking account. See id. at 26-28.
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The result is a limitation of states' ability to engage in countercyclical
budgeting and saving in rainy day funds. Instead, states are en-
couraged to cut taxes or increase spending in good times, which only
sets up larger budget gaps and more difficult choices in bad times.
Still another budgeting trick by the states is to engage in legal
fictions to work around legal restrictions on budgets and debt issu-
ance, such as issuing "subject-to-appropriation" debt.113 Subject-to-ap-
propriation debt involves states contracting, subject to appropriation,
to pay the annual debt service on a revenue bond to the government
entity issuing that bond.114 Because of the "subject to" language,
states are not bound to pay the obligation absent an appropriation,
and thus they incur no debt for debt-limit purposes prior to the
appropriation. 115
The prevalence of these tricks suggests that states' budget
problems require a two-part political solution. First, fiscal federalism
needs to be reevaluated. And second, to the extent that fiscal federal-
ism leaves states with a procyclical budget, state political agency
problems need to be reformed to create countercyclical spending and
saving mechanisms.
The issue of how best to go about these reforms is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is important to note that these problems
are structural political ones, not financial ones. They do not concern
the particular choices necessary in balancing any given fiscal year's
budget. Instead, the political wrangling over tax hikes and spending
cuts is a symptom of much deeper structural problems for state budg-
ets. While procedural mechanisms like bankruptcy might potentially
facilitate the choices necessary to balance budgets, they may them-
selves be problematic, as discussed below, and budget crises will inevi-
tably reoccur absent structural change.
Accordingly, proposals to address state fiscal crises need to be
evaluated in political, rather than financial terms. Many of the pro-
posals for addressing state fiscal crises involve the use of some form of
a bankruptcy regime-meaning a binding collective debt restructur-
ing proceeding.
113 See Briffault, supra note 43, at 920.
114 See id. at 920-21. A revenue bond is payable solely by a dedicated stream of income
from a discrete project such as a toll road or a power plant, as distinct from a general
obligation bond, which is payable from any of a state's revenues. See id. at 918-19.
115 See id. at 920-25; see also Lonegan v. State, 819 A.2d 395, 401, 409 (N.J. 2003) (hold-
ing that general obligation bonds issued "subject to appropriation [s]" do not count toward
debt limit because they are not legally enforceable against the state); Lonegan v. State, 809
A.2d 91, 136 (N.J. 2002) (holding that school construction bonds issued "subject to appro-
priations" do not count toward debt limit because they are not legally enforceable against
the state).
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III
THE BANKRUPTCY TOOLBOX
A. Traditional Rationales for Bankruptcy
Even if the states' problems were primarily fiscal, rather than po-
litical, would bankruptcy make sense as a response? Traditionally,
bankruptcy has not been viewed as a political tool. Instead, debt-re-
structuring regimes have been justified by reference to three
rationales:
1. Overcoming collective action problems for creditors, includ-
ing both a race-to-the-courthouse phenomenon and a free-rid-
ing problem as creditors wait for other creditors to forgive
debt;
2. Restructuring in order to preserve going-concern value and
prevent illiquidity from metastasizing into insolvency (and its
collateral damage on non-creditor constituencies); and
3. Providing a fresh start in order to avoid economic loss due to
debt overhang.
None of these rationales fits state bankruptcy well. As discussed
below, states do not experience a race to the courthouse; states lack
any meaningful going-concern value because they cannot be liqui-
dated and can almost never be truly insolvent; and debt overhang
problems for states are different than for individuals, firms, or na-
tional sovereigns because most creditors are "domestic"-meaning
that they are state residents, who are concerned not just about ex-
isting debt, but also about the state's ability to provide future benefits
and services.
1. Creditors' Collective Action Problems
One prominent rationale for bankruptcy is the avoidance of col-
lective action problems for creditors. The chief collective action con-
cern is a race to the courthouse, as creditors compete for the limited
common pool of the debtor's assets. 116 Per this rationale, bankruptcy
is a procedural mechanism for the orderly and fair distribution of
those assets.
States, however, do not represent a limited common pool be-
cause they have the ability to increase revenue and cut expenses in a
manner that firms or individuals do not. To be sure, the Laffer curve
imposes a theoretical limit on states' ability to increase revenue or cut
services; if taxes become too high or services too meager, enough tax-
116 See, e.g.,JAcKSON, supra note 21, at 10-19 (describing bankruptcy as a response to a
common pool problem).
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payers may leave the jurisdiction, thus causing a net a decline in
revenue. 117
Even if states did represent a common pool problem, however, it
is not clear how much bankruptcy would help in addressing the col-
lective action problem. Bankruptcy's major tool in dealing with the
race to the courthouse is the automatic stay.' 18 State sovereign immu-
nity, while often waived, limits that problem, meaning that the auto-
matic stay may not have much additional purchase in addressing
collective action problems. And, if the boundaries of a particular
state's waivers of sovereign immunity are suboptimal for dealing with a
fiscal crisis, that is a political problem.
2. Preservation of Going-Concern Value
A second rationale for debt-restructuring regimes like bankruptcy
is to enable the preservation of going-concern value in illiquid but
solvent firms. Illiquidity can quickly become insolvency (just as insol-
vency can result in illiquidity) when individuals or firms must dispose
of assets at fire sale prices to gin up liquidity. The result is the destruc-
tion of going-concern value-the value of an enterprise above liquida-
tion value or difference between the value of the whole enterprise and
the sum of its parts. Such destruction can hurt not just creditors
through the loss of going-concern value, but also other non-creditor
constituencies such as communities and purchasers who benefit from
the existence of the debtor as an operating entity. Bankruptcy can
provide a forum for creditors to make a collective decision about a
firm's viability and determine if its illiquidity is because of or in spite
of insolvency and whether the firm should be reorganized or liqui-
dated. It can also enable a "soft landing" to help protect non-creditor
constituencies.
The preservation of going-concern value makes little sense when
applied to states for two reasons. First, states do not have going-con-
cern value, as that exists only in relation to liquidation value, and
states cannot be liquidated or sold. Indeed, it is hard to speak of the
financial value of a state in any meaningful sense. For this reason, it
makes little sense to speak of a "soft landing" because there is no land-
ing to soften. 119
Second, while states may face liquidity problems, they are never
insolvent in any meaningful sense other than in extreme disaster sce-
117 See James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 7
(1971); Tiebout, supra note 46.
118 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
119 But see In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 99 B.R. 155, 161-73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989)
(describing bargaining between state and creditors over ways in which electric power rates
would be increased in a public utility's Chapter 11 plan).
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narios. While states can conceivably be insolvent on a snapshot bal-
ance sheet basis, this insolvency need not be more than temporary, as
states, unlike firms, can increase revenue by raising taxes or cut ex-
penses by reducing services. t 20 Whereas firms' ability to increase reve-
nue or cut expenses is limited by market conditions and competition,
states are limited solely by the Laffer curve and state politics.
12
'
One could imagine a cataclysmic disaster that would leave a state
unable to raise sufficient revenue to service its existing debt obliga-
tions, regardless of the level of taxation, because of devastation to the
tax base: a tsunami wiping out much of Rhode Island, an earthquake
leaving much of California under the Pacific Ocean, or a nuclear dis-
aster making much of a state uninhabitable. 122 It is not clear, how-
ever, why bankruptcy is needed to insure against such freak
occurrences or why the federal union could not be relied upon for
mutual aid in such circumstances. Indeed, federal transfer payments
themselves provide states with some insurance against localized reve-
nue shocks. 123
Ultimately, the preservation of going-concern value does not pre-
sent a compelling argument for creating a special state-restructuring
procedure like a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
3. Fresh Start and Debt Overhang
Provision of a fresh start for debtors through debt forgiveness
makes bankruptcy a type of social insurance against financial failure.
Overleveraged individuals have limited incentives to increase produc-
tivity because the gains from their labor go to their creditors. 124 Simi-
larly, the earnings of overleveraged firms go to creditors, not owners.
This possibility limits individuals' and firms' incentives to take risks
lest they end up in eternal debt peonage. Bankruptcy or other types
of debt restructuring are a method of fixing this incentive problem
and returning overleveraged individuals and firms to productivity.
Economist Paul Krugman has applied this rationale to sovereign
debt, arguing that a restructuring regime is necessary to prevent eco-
120 States may choose to tie their hands in this regard through constitutional limits on
tax increases, such as California's Proposition 13. See infta text accompanying note 152.
121 See sources cited supra note 117.
122 Arguably, this happened to Louisiana, and to the city of New Orleans in particular,
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The jurisdictions faced huge new costs, a reduced popu-
lation, and a reduced economy, but all of their prior debts. Yet the state and city both
muddled through, although New Orleans reportedly did consider filing a Chapter 9
bankruptcy.
123 For estimates of the insurance function of federal transfer payments, see supra note
63 and accompanying text.
124 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1393 (1985) (outlining the justifications for the "fresh start" policy).
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nomic losses from debt overhang. 125 An overleveraged public debtor
may be unable to obtain the financing to undertake net present value
(NPV) positive projects. A system for deleveraging the debtor thus
avoids deadweight loss. The fresh-start-debt-overhang rationale pro-
vides the strongest argument for a state bankruptcy system, but its ap-
plication to states is messy and uncertain.
For some welfare-enhancing projects, states have a workaround to
debt-overhang problems. Project finance in the form of revenue
bonds enables a state to separate the financing of revenue-generating
projects from the finances of the state as a whole, which may be sub-
ject to statutory creditor-priority schemes. 126 Revenue bonds are
bonds backed solely by the cash flow from a specific revenue source,
as opposed to general obligation bonds, which are backed by the full
faith and credit of the state. 127 Holders of revenue bonds have first
dibs on the cash flow from that revenue source, ahead of other credi-
tors of the state. 128 Thus, a state can borrow funds for a NPV positive
project by borrowing against the future cash flows on that project. For
example, a state can finance a toll road by borrowing against the fu-
ture revenue from the tolls. Similarly, a state can finance a power
plant by borrowing against the plant's future revenue. States and lo-
cal governments use revenue bonds extensively: between 1996 and
2010, revenues from specific sources backed two-thirds of all U.S. state
and local government debt.129
Some value-enhancing projects, however, do not produce distinct
cash-flow streams, such as investments in health, education, and wel-
fare. These investments may indirectly increase property values and
property tax revenues, yet revenue bonds cannot always finance these
projects. 130 Even so, the fresh-start-debt-overhang bankruptcy ratio-
nale is less convincing for states than for other entities.
First, it makes little sense to talk of a state's productivity as one
would an individual's or a firm's. An individual's or firm's productiv-
ity is measured by earnings. But a state's earnings are largely a conse-
quence of the productivity of its population and its tax code.
125 See Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEv. ECON. 253,
266-67 (1988).
126 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 8.
127 E.g., Kordana, supra note 16, at 1049.
128 E.g., id.
129 See STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 5 (2011) (citing data from Thomson Reuters provided by the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association).
130 If there is a clear positive effect on property values, revenue bonds known as tax
increment financings (TIF) can be issued backed by the property tax revenue in excess of a
preproject baseline. See Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, Tax Increment Financing. A
Tool for Local Economic Development, LAND LINES, Jan. 2006, at 2, 2.
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A state's ability to undertake NPV positive projects could provide
a measure of its productivity. Yet, in order to undertake such projects,
the state must divert resources from residents who could possibly un-
dertake those projects directly, without state involvement.
Whereas individuals and firms should maximize their productiv-
ity to increase their consumption power and thereby enhance their
own welfare, such a rationale does not hold with the states. An in-
crease in state taxation does not necessarily translate into a net welfare
increase; it does, however, add transaction costs and redistribute
wealth, which may or may not be Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Second, many of a state's creditors are domestic, meaning that
they experience an offset between losses in a restructuring and the
future benefits or business they receive from the state. State bond
debt-known somewhat confusingly as "municipal debt" or "munici-
pal bonds"-and states' vendors particularly exemplify this problem.
Municipal bond creditors are often state residents, because the state
tax benefits of municipal debt, which are in addition to the federal tax
benefits, accrue solely to state residents. 131 Similarly, states' vendors
and social benefit recipients are mainly residents. Accordingly, it is
not clear that debt forgiveness or other restructuring would actually
be in the interest of the state's residents as a whole, much less for any
particular resident. The future benefits a state's residents would re-
ceive from a state being able to undertake more NPV positive projects
would be offset to some degree by the immediate losses from debt
forgiveness. Conversely, if the state had to increase taxes or cut ser-
vices to pay its obligations, these costs would offset the benefit to the
residents of timely, full payment. In the abstract, it is impossible to
know how either of these scenarios would net out, but at the very least,
the prevalence of domestic creditors considerably complicates the
idea that a fresh start through debt forgiveness is beneficial to states'
residents.
Finally, and most critically, the restructuring rationale explains
bankruptcy as a means of preserving the going-concern value for firms
with good overall business models that also have liquidity problems.132
Restructuring, however, is always conditioned on three basic princi-
ples. First, the debtor must have a viable business model ("feasibility"
131 See Brief for Nat'l Fed'n of Mun. Analysts as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 17, Dep't of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008)
(No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115441; Investor Bulletin: Focus on Municipal Bonds, U.S. SEC. &
ExcH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipal.htm (last updated Sept. 20,
2010).
132 See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, TA.R.P. RIP.: Illiquency Watch, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 14,
2008, 12:31 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/11/tarp-rip-illiqu.html;
David Zaring, Anna Gelpern: ... and Another Thing: Illiquency, THE CONGLOMERATE (Oct. 14,
2008), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/10/anna-gelpern-an.html.
14372012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
in bankruptcy parlance), meaning that there will not be repeat bank-
ruptcy filings. 133 Second, the restructuring has to give creditors at
least as much as in a liquidation ("best interests" in bankruptcy par-
lance) .134 Third, the restructuring must be done in good faith (which
includes observance of the absolute priority rule-meaning that se-
nior claimants must be paid in full before there is any recovery for
junior claimants-and includes the absence of unfair discrimination
among similarly situated creditors). 13 5 These concepts have little ap-
plicability to state bankruptcy.
The feasibility of state bankruptcy plans depends on state political
will as much as general economic factors. States pose a real danger of
serial filing. It would be possible to restrict repeat filings by states, but
it is unclear whether such a restriction would be credible in the face of
a serious state budget crisis, and if it were, it would ultimately defeat
the purpose of state bankruptcy. Indeed, even in the rarely used
Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy context, serial filing is a problem. 136
Similarly, the best interests principle makes no sense for states.
There is no "liquidation value" for a state and thus no going-concern
value. How can one possibly value California? Finally, good faith is
questionable given the motivation for state bankruptcy proposals,
which are conceived as a method for enabling states to reject collec-
tive bargaining agreements and pension obligations (and more gener-
ally to weaken organized labor as a political force) .137 The definition
of good faith is inherently problematic, but bankruptcy jurisprudence
has tended to distinguish between actions undertaken offensively and
those undertaken defensively, with the sword as bad faith and the
shield as good faith.' 38
133 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 941, 1129(a)(11) (2006).
134 See id. §§941, 1129(a)( 7 ), 1173(a)(2), 1225(a)(4)-(5), 1325(a)(4)-(5).
135 See id. §§941, 1129(a)(3), 1129(b)(2)(B), 1225(a)(3), 1325(a)(3).
136 There have been 260 Chapter 9 filings between January 1980 and April 2012 ac-
cording to PACER data. PACER, https://pacer.login.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl?appurl=
https://pcl.uscourts.gov/search (log in and select the "bankruptcy" tab, then select the
chapter as "Chapter 9," then hit "search"; this retrieves all PACER files for Chapter 9
cases). Forty-eight of the 260 are erroneous filings, such as Chapter 9 filings by individual
debtors. Of the remaining 212 filings, forty-four were by municipalities or counties (as
opposed to hospital or sanitary districts or other entities). Five of those forty-four were
repeat filings. The serial filers are Pritchard, Alabama; the Village of Washington Park,
Illinois; the City of Westminster, Texas; the City of Macks Creek, Missouri; and the Town of
Moffet, Oklahoma. Another forty-four of the 212 were by various Nebraska sanitary dis-
tricts. In other words, Nebraska sanitary districts have used Chapter 9 as extensively as
cities and counties. Given the experience of Chapter 9, one might seriously question
whether it should be repealed, rather than extended.
137 See Gillette, supra note 18, at 1-2.
138 See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 101-05 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding
designation of votes of claims purchased by a competitor for the purpose of forcing a
strategic transaction rather than protecting its interests as a creditor); In re Owens Corning,
419 F.3d 195, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (refusing to grant substantive consolidation when sought
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4. Bankruptcy as Market Discipline Insurance
The fresh-start-debt-overhang rationale understands bankruptcy
as a type of social insurance for financial failure. While this view has
been most prominent in discussions of consumer bankruptcy, 13 9
George Triantis redirected it as a justification for state bankruptcy be-
cause insurance "premia" provides a form of market discipline for the
states. 140 Triantis has proposed permitting states to opt into a bank-
ruptcy system for their prospective obligations, 141 meaning that if a
state were unable to meet its obligations and fulfilled the require-
ments of the bankruptcy regime, those obligations would be dis-
charged. The premia for this insurance would be found in the price
of credit for the states. 142 Riskier states would have higher premia,
and the market would function as a risk regulator.
There are several problems with an insurance view of state bank-
ruptcy. First, it is unclear what bankruptcy would add in terms of mar-
ket discipline that the municipal bond market (again, referring to the
state bond market) does not already provide.
The mere risk of a state defaulting on its bonds affects states' abil-
ity to go to the market for more capital. 143 Even without bankruptcy,
riskier states pay higher risk premia.144 Perhaps the existence of a
to be used as a sword and not a shield); In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 164-69 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that it is bad faith to file for Chapter 11 for the purpose of avoiding
paying a single creditor); In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 66-67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009) (holding that there is good faith to file for Chapter 11 when creditor could not
negotiate).
139 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start
or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1065-66 (2004); Adam Feibelman, Defining the
Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129
(2005); Richard M. Hynes, Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 350-59
(explaining debt relief as a form of social insurance and comparing bankruptcy to other
social insurance programs).
140 George Triantis, Bankruptcy for the States and by the States, in WHEN STATES Go BROKE:
ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FiscAL CRISIS, supra note 8,
at 237, 241.
141 Id. at 242.
142 Id. at 243.
143 Other state creditors might not adjust as readily as bond creditors, but that has
little to do with whether there is a bankruptcy option available. The problems of
nonadjusting creditors and future claimants are particularly acute for states, which have a
multitude of trade vendors, retirees, tax refund claimants, and tort creditors (present and
future).
144 See, e.g., Tamim Bayoumi et al., Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evi-
dence from U.S. States, 27J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1046, 1047 (1995) (finding that in-
creases in relative state debt loads correspond with an increase in yields on state general
obligation bonds); Morris Goldstein & Geoffrey Woglom, Market-Based Fiscal Discipline in
Monetary Unions: Evidence from the US Municipal Bond Market, in ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL
BANK: ISSUES IN EUROPE AND LESSONS FROM THE US, supra note 63, at 228, 253-54 (finding
evidence of lower borrowing costs for states with more responsible fiscal policies); Poterba
& Rueben, supra note 50, at 537 (finding correlation between unexpected state deficits and
high bond yields).
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formal bankruptcy regime would increase these premia by steepening
the priority hierarchy, but a state default under the current regime
would probably have much the same impact on bond values as would
a state bankruptcy. States do not need formal bankruptcy regimes in
order to impose costs on creditors, and so sophisticated creditors al-
ready adjust their risk premia. Therefore, even without bankruptcy,
the market imposes considerable discipline upon the states.
Second, bankruptcy would only be effective at disciplining state
budgets if the market were efficient. As noted above, bankruptcy
would be unlikely to add much to the efficiency of municipal debt
markets. The irony, however, is that these markets do not appear to
be particularly efficient themselves, as discussed below, despite being
the most robust and liquid market in state debt. Put differently, it is
not apparent what in Triantis's proposal would result in a more effi-
cient market discipline relative to what municipal bond rates already
provide.
The municipal bond market has a much higher quotient of retail
investors than other securities markets, in part because only individu-
als are able to benefit from the tax-advantaged treatment of some mu-
nicipal bonds. 145 The presence of so many retail investors raises
questions of market efficiency, as retail investors often lack the access
to information and the analytical capacity of institutional investors. 146
Moreover, to the extent the market is betting that at least some states
(e.g., California) are too big to fail, market discipline might be weak.
A glance at historical credit default swap (CDS) prices for munici-
pal bonds raises serious questions about the market's efficiency.1 47
The CDS market is linked with the debt markets themselves, as an
investor wishing to go long on municipal debt could either sell CDS
protection or buy the debt directly. The arbitrage between municipal
bonds and CDS derivatives is distorted by the lack of tax advantages
for the CDS market and by the more constrained pool of CDS inves-
tors given the absence of retail investors in CDS.1 48 Nonetheless, arbi-
145 Compare Holders of U.S. Municipal Securities, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. AsS'N, http://
www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/Municipal-US-Municipal-
Holders-SIFMA.xls (last visited July 15, 2012), with Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail
Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1026 (2009).
146 See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor, 95 VA. L. REv. 1105, 1116-22
(2009) (arguing that retail investors may enhance market efficiency); cf Brian D. Galle &
Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Municipal Bonds BeJustified?, TAx NOTES,
Oct. 8, 2007, at 153, 155 (arguing that there is no good justification for "a discriminatory
tax exemption for municipal bonds"); Langevoort, supra note 145, at 1043-44 (question-
ing assumptions about retail investor behavior and sophistication).
147 See infta Figure 5.
148 See Mike Jakola, Credit Default Swap Index Options: Evaluating the Viability of a
New Product for the CBOE 15-16 (June 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fimrc/papers/jakola.pdf.
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trage possibilities remain between selling CDS protection and
investing directly, meaning that a rise in CDS prices-when investors
demand a larger risk premium for going long on the state's debt-
would translate into an increase in the yield that investors demand in
the municipal bond market.
It is unclear how robust the municipal CDS market is, but CDS
pricing seems to reflect significant pooling and herding behavior.1 49
There is a high correlation in CDS pricing for most states. Table 1,
below, shows correlations in CDS pricing over three years, from July
2008 to July 2011, among eight states selected based on the length of
time that data exists on their municipal bond CDS: California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.
State municipal bond CDS data does not exist for all states, and for
many it has existed for a substantially shorter period than the three-
year window available for these eight states. This group of states in-
cludes some with recurrent fiscal crises and at least one (California)
with a fundamentally broken fiscal constitution, as well as some states
with relatively healthy budget processes (e.g., Massachusetts).
The correlations are presented in Table 1 as Pearson's r, the cor-
relation variable expressing the linear dependence between two vari-
ables from +1 and -1. For municipal bond one-year CDS prices, the
correlations for these states range from 54% (Illinois and Texas) to
98% (Nevada and New Jersey). Indeed, excluding Illinois and Texas,
the correlations among the other six states are all over 90%, which
indicates that investors are generally not responding to state-specific
factors. Unfortunately, between July 2008 and July 2011, national fac-
tors were unusually powerful and may have disguised meaningful mar-
ket responses to state-specific factors. Regardless, while CDS pricing
for Michigan and Illinois in Figure 5 (the first and second major
spikes, respectively) shows the existence of some state-specific pricing,
it is not clear how Professor Triantis's proposal can work in a market
with weak efficiency.
149 See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Am.
ECON. REv. 465, 465 (1990) (describing herding behavior by reputationally concerned
agents); see generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 373-74 (1973)
(discussing how the inability to distinguish between risks causes players to rely on market
signaling that leads to pooling equilibria).
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TABLE 1: STATE MUNICIPAL BOND CDS PRICING CORRELATION 150
CA IL MA MI NJ NV NY TX
CA 67% 91% 90% 92% 92% 94% 91%
IL 67% 65% 77% 78% 69% 73% 54%
MA 91% 65% 95% 94% 97% 90% 96%
MI 90% 77% 95% 96% 96% 90% 89%
NJ 92% 78% 94% 96% 98% 94% 88%
NV 92% 69% 97% 96% 98% 94% 93%
NY 94% 73% 90% 90% 94% 94% 87%
TX 91% 54% 96% 89% 88% 93% 87%
FIGURE 5: HISTORICAL STATE MUNICIPAL BOND CDS PRICES
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If bankruptcy qua insurance were effective at creating market dis-
cipline, it might lessen the political economy problems, including po-
litical moral hazard in state politics. Yet, because many of the political
economy problems are due to self-interested actors only secondarily
interested in the well-being of the state, the impact of market disci-
pline might be limited.
Critically, however, market discipline via bankruptcy would not
affect the underlying structural problem in state budgets. In addition,
150 Author's calculations using Bloomberg GCDS 1-year CDS data (CMAN).
151 Bloomberg GCDS. Data is CMAN for 1-year CDS.
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bankruptcy poses its own moral-hazard problems. 152 The traditional
responses to moral hazard are copayments, deductibles, coverage lim-
its, and exclusions that aim to impose some limited cost internaliza-
tion on the insured. Bankruptcy's versions of these moral-hazard
reducers are the best interests test, the nondischargeability of certain
types of debt, the absolute priority rule, and good-faith filing and con-
firmation requirements. None of these solutions are meaningful,
however, in the context of a state bankruptcy.
The best interests test lets creditors insist on receiving at least the
liquidation value of the debtor. But for a state, this test is meaning-
less, as states cannot be liquidated. Nondischargeability functions as
policy exclusion, but the wider the exclusion, the less effective the in-
surance coverage. Nondischargeability also functions as a type of hid-
den priority system. What, if any, obligations of a state would be
nondischargeable is unclear, but this is the moral-hazard reducer that
is the most adaptable to a state bankruptcy system.
The absolute priority rule, which insists on paying senior claim-
ants in full before junior claimants receive any recovery, functions as a
type of deductible-equity must pay out before creditors absorb
losses. 153 But the absolute priority rule as applied to equity makes no
sense for states, as there are no equity holders, only residents who
152 There may also be adverse selection and information problems. It is possible that
states would opt into a bankruptcy system because they possess better information about
their risks than their creditors, so the insurance is being inefficiently underpriced. Parties
opt for insurance as a risk-management device. Third-party insurance (for that is what
bankruptcy would be since the losses would be absorbed by creditors) only makes sense if it
is cheaper than first-party insurance (losses absorbed by the states' citizens in the form of
reduced services and higher taxes). Why would there be a pricing difference between first
and third party insurance?
One possibility is that there is a difference in ability or willingness to bear risk. Third-
party insurance makes sense when parties are faced with losses that they cannot easily ab-
sorb and which cannot be easily managed through more careful behavior. These factors
are generally inapplicable for the states. They can typically manage the risk of insolvency
through the budget process. One exception is the sudden catastrophe scenario (e.g., epic
natural disaster or derivatives gamble like Orange County). See Leah Nathans Spiro &
Nanette Byrnes, Today, Orange County... The Muni Mess on Wall Street: How Bad?, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 28, 28-30. Another exception is where a state has so completely tied its
hands politically on the budget process that it cannot correct course. See, e.g., Nanette
Asimov, Prop. 39 Passage a Blow to Prop. 13, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2000, at Al (describing a
similar scenario in California caused by Proposition 13 in 1978, which was later amended
by Proposition 39 in 2000). Perhaps a state's citizens are unusually loss averse, but if so, it
also seems unlikely that they would want to pay the bankruptcy premium.
There may also be an information problem making bankruptcy insurance markets
imperfect. The state debt market lacks many of the traditional controls over and informa-
tion sources about state budgets that it has over private companies. State debt obligations
do not include financial covenants and ratios and state budget reporting is not subject to
the same legal requirements as private companies. These factors weaken market discipline
and increase the likelihood of inefficiently priced insurance (i.e., too high or too low).
153 See, e.g., Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1939) (applying the
absolute priority rule).
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cannot be stripped of their residency the way equity holders are
stripped of their ownership of a firm. 154
Conceivably, the absolute priority rule could be adapted to re-
quire a state's taxpayers to pay as much as they can, either by maximiz-
ing tax revenue or minimizing services up to the tipping point of the
Laffer curve, before creditors absorb losses. But this modified rule
would render bankruptcy worthless as an insurance regime. The
whole point of such insurance is to protect the states' residents and
shift losses from them to third-party creditors.
Good-faith filing and confirmation requirements play much the
same function as absolute priority, even if they cast a broader net. But
is it good faith for a state to impose costs on creditors when it has not
first asked its citizens to make sacrifices via higher taxation and re-
duced services? If absolute priority and good-faith requirements are
taken seriously, then state bankruptcy would provide insurance in the
form of true loss shifting only in extremely limited scenarios where
the federal union itself is likely to bailout states without a moral-haz-
ard problem (e.g., for natural disasters).
Finally, even if bankruptcy can be justified as insurance for ex-
treme, catastrophic risk, it still needs to be compared to the costs of
regular catastrophic-risk insurance and against the high likelihood
that the federal government would assist a state faced with a cata-
strophic budget crisis (for whatever cause). The federal union itself is
an imperfect form of catastrophe insurance for states.
B. What Bankruptcy Cannot Do: Cure Bad Business Models
If state fiscal problems are structural, albeit exacerbated by politi-
cal agency problems, can bankruptcy help? The answer is no. Bank-
ruptcy is a remarkably successful tool for dealing with collective action
problems, 155 preserving going-concern value, ridding debt over-
hang,156 and providing social insurance. 157 If a firm's problems are
merely financial-that is, if the firm is overleveraged or illiquid but
solvent-bankruptcy provides an excellent forum for reorganizing the
154 Absolute priority also conflicts with state constitutional priority schemes. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 8(a) (requiring state revenue to be used first to pay public school
and public higher-education expenses). The status of these schemes in a federal bank-
ruptcy proceeding would be uncertain. Arguably they should be honored like private con-
tractual subordination agreements under 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2006).
155 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 21, at 10-19 (1986) (describing bankruptcy as a re-
sponse to a common pool problem).
156 See, e.g., DouG-LAs G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRuPTcv 40-50 (4th ed. 2006)
(explaining the fresh-start rationale for individual debtors); Jackson, supra note 124, at
1395-98 (1985); Krugman, supra note 125, at 254-55 (1988) (describing debt-overhang
problems in developing countries).
157 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 139, at 1065-66 (discussing bankruptcy as social in-
surance); Feibelman, supra note 139, at 129-34 (same); Hynes, supra note 139 (same).
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firm's capital structure to preserve going-concern value or, if there is
none, to provide for an orderly liquidation. Moreover, bankruptcy
provides a backdrop against which private orderings can occur, both
when the initial decision to extend credit is made and when outstand-
ing debt needs to be restructured.
But bankruptcy is not a panacea for all problems that enterprises
face. Bankruptcy can cure financial problems, but not operational
problems. Bankruptcy can extricate an enterprise from burdensome
contracts158 and slough off extra leverage, but bankruptcy cannot fix a
bad business model.
If a firm's business is the sale of whale oil, corset stays, bustles,
flash bulbs, slide rules, floppy disks, cassette tapes, 8-tracks, or books
or CDs in a brick-and-mortar store, bankruptcy cannot help it beyond
providing an orderly way to redeploy its assets and giving it a dignified
funeral. At best, bankruptcy can buy an enterprise the financial
breathing room to undertake an operational restructuring, but noth-
ing in bankruptcy law-understood broadly, with a small "b" as any
form of debt restructuring, not necessarily along the lines of the ex-
isting chapters of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code159-can fix a bad business
model.
In Chapter 11, bankruptcy provides a forum for creditors to make
a collective decision about the viability of a firm. If creditors do not
think that a firm's business model will work even as restructured, they
can try to block a reorganization plan and liquidate the firm. 160 The
creditors' collective viability decision is only meaningful, however, be-
cause of the liquidation option, which gives them leverage to push for
changes that they believe will enhance viability. Thus, while creditors
cannot formally require price increases in a debtor firm's products in
Chapter 11, they can functionally achieve this goal by refusing to vote
for a plan that does not contemplate such a move, either explicitly or
by providing for creditor control over new management-perhaps by
transforming creditors into shareholders. 161 In a state bankruptcy,
however, creditors would not have the leverage of refusing to vote for
a plan and moving for liquidation if the state did not increase taxes.
For a state, as with a municipality, there is no liquidation op-
tion.162 Therefore, even if the state's business model is fundamentally
flawed-as it necessarily is given the problems with the current fiscal
158 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (permitting rejection of unexpired leases and executory
contracts).
159 See Gelpern, supra note 11, at 893.
160 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
161 Id. § 1129(a)(7).
162 In theory a municipal corporation could be liquidated, but Chapter 9 does not
contemplate such an action. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 425, 465 (1993).
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federalism arrangement-creditors would be stuck with a financially
reorganized but nonviable entity.
Existing chapters of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code attempt to deal
with this problem with a (vague) plan of feasibility requirements. 163
But none of the chapters contemplate the bankruptcy of an entity
where there is an inherent risk of serial filing due to structural
problems. Nothing prevents states from being serial bankruptcy filers
in the same way that Argentina and Mexico have been serial defaulters
and several municipalities have been serial Chapter 9 filers. 164
Bankruptcy cannot fix the underlying cyclical structural problem
in states' budgets stemming from the confluence of unfunded federal
mandates and balanced budget requirements. At most, then, bank-
ruptcy might be able to mitigate some of the political-agency
problems that exacerbate state budget problems. As the following sec-
tion argues, however, bankruptcy is a perilous tool to use to solve po-
litical problems.
C. Bankruptcy as a Political Tool
The ill fit of traditional bankruptcy to the states suggests an addi-
tional rationale for bankruptcy: bankruptcy as a political tool. Bank-
ruptcy could function as a political tool in several ways. It could serve
as a political discipline mechanism, provide cover for politically un-
popular decisions, serve as a convening mechanism to facilitate nego-
tiations, and facilitate negotiations by setting baseline rules and
alternatives.
Bankruptcy could serve as a political-discipline mechanism, in
that a state's bankruptcy plan could impose discipline on the state's
budget politics. State bankruptcy, then, could function as a form of
"second-order rationality," 165 as it gives state politicians the tools to tie
their hands because they know they lack the political willpower other-
wise. But any second-order rationality benefits might be short lasting,
because courts have no ability to prevent states from going right back
to their old habits once they are out of bankruptcy, or more precisely,
these benefits do not fix the problem of the business cycle interacting
with state balanced budget requirements, much less problems in state
political economies.
163 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(7), 1129(a)(11), 1225(a)(6), 1325(a)(6).
164 See Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance, 2003 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
AcTIVrrx' 1, 1, 6 (discussing countries that are in serial default). For serial Chapter 9 filings,
see supra note 136.
165 See Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355,
360-62 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (explaining that second-order
rationality refers to a range of rational responses to cognitive biases).
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Bankruptcy could also provide politicians with the cover to un-
dertake deals that are opposed by their constituents. It is impossible
to say, however, whether this feature enables politicians to look out
for the commonwealth rather than be beholden to narrow rent-seek-
ing interests, or whether it merely gives politicians the ability to reach
deals of personal convenience without regard to their constituents'
interests.
Bankruptcy also provides a convening and negotiating mecha-
nism that can bind nonconsenting holdouts to a deal. Its usefulness,
however, is limited in the case of the states. As a convening tool, bank-
ruptcy brings all claimants together into a single proceeding and set-
tles (nearly) all claims.
In Chapter 11, this works by bringing together creditors, employ-
ees, and equity holders. But for states, a major stakeholder is absent-
voters. Court-mandated austerity measures (or tax increases) require
the acquiescence of voters because the politicians involved in reach-
ing deals on austerity measures are responsive to voters. The exclu-
sion of other stakeholders may make creditors in turn reluctant to cut
deals because of a concern as to whether the deals will stick without
the assent of the absent stakeholders. Thus, bankruptcy's convening
power is limited for states.
Bankruptcy can facilitate negotiations by presenting an unattrac-
tive alternative to a negotiated solution, a type of "penalty default"
rule. 166 Contract theory has long debated the use and usefulness of
penalty default rules-the judicial imposition of contract gap fillers
that contracting parties do not like in order to incentivize more com-
plete contracting' 67 -and while the penalty default rule concept has
been expanded beyond contract law, 168 it has extended only passingly
166 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 114 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing pen-
alty defaults); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (coining the term "penalty default rule").
167 See generally Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 589 (2006) (arguing in favor of penalty default rules); Omri Ben-Shahar & John
A.E. Pottow, On The Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 651 (2006) (discussing
the "sticky" nature of penalty default rules, even when they seem inefficient); Curtis
Bridgeman, Default Rules, Penalty Default Rules, and New Formalism, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 683
(2006) (discussing the applicability of penalty default rules in the new formalist view of
contract law); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and
Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 913 (2006) (applying thought about constitutional
rights to penalty default rules); Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 557 (2006) (criticizing popular support for penalty default rules); Eric A.
Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 563 (2006)
(arguing against penalty default rules).
168 See generally Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete
Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 725 (2006) (proposing a relationship-specific invest-
ment default to help fill incomplete contracts); Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family
Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 779 (2006) (extending the idea of a
default rule to child custody arrangements); John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a
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to bankruptcy. 169 Bankruptcy can be understood as serving a similar
function, not in creating complete contracting incentives, but in creat-
ing negotiation incentives. If the parties find the outcome of a bank-
ruptcy (including the costs of the bankruptcy) less attractive than
those in a deal outside of bankruptcy, it encourages them to reach a
deal outside of bankruptcy. It is unclear, however, whether a state
bankruptcy system would in fact facilitate negotiations outside of
bankruptcy, as bankruptcy could be a more attractive outcome to
some parties.
Bankruptcy's operation as a penalty default rule works differently
in the context of state or municipal bankruptcy than in business or
consumer bankruptcy, because when states attempt to close budget
gaps, the negotiating parties are not the creditors negotiating with
each other and the debtor as they are in a business or consumer bank-
ruptcy. Instead, the negotiations are between political parties, and
the parties' motivations are different from those of creditors or debt-
ors. Instead of financial interests at stake, each political party has par-
ticular constituencies of creditors or state service beneficiaries that it
wishes to protect, as well as a political agenda it wishes to advance.
Unless the bankruptcy "penalty" is a political penalty, bankruptcy
might be seen by a political party as more attractive than a negotiated
resolution of the budget gap outside of bankruptcy.
Consider, for example, a state bankruptcy regime in which collec-
tive bargaining agreements could be rejected. Such a regime might
encourage public employee unions and their Democratic allies to
compromise outside of bankruptcy, but it would make Republican
governors and legislators less likely to do so, particularly if bankruptcy
offered a broader way to cut spending and avoid revenue increases.
Similarly, consider a state bankruptcy regime that protected collective
bargaining agreements but mandated that budget gaps be closed
through progressive income-tax increases. Such a regime would en-
courage Republicans to compromise outside of bankruptcy, but might
make Democrats less likely to do so. A bankruptcy regime that is too
favorable to any partisan agenda could increase gridlock and reduce
democracy, rather than encourage political compromise. From a de-
cision-theory standpoint, the value of a bankruptcy backdrop for pro-
ducing more efficient, negotiated solutions is highly dependent upon
the terms of the bankruptcy system and whether the bankruptcy pen-
alty is appropriately calibrated to the negotiating parties.
Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 825 (2006) (discussing
the possibility of default rules in constitutional law); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-
Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 861 (2006) (examining default rules
used for environmental regulation).
169 Robert R. Niccolini, Note, The Voidability of Actions Taken in Violation of the Automatic
Stay: Application of the Information-Forcing Paradigm, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1680-84 (1992).
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Bankruptcy's power as a negotiating mechanism for resolving dis-
putes among creditors is further diminished because of the lack of a
viable liquidation threat and absolute priority distribution baseline.
For firms and individual debtors, bankruptcy forces claimants to come
to the negotiating table, lest they be locked out of a legally binding
deal. The convening power's real value is that it is coupled with a
negotiating mechanism that relies on two implicit threats that facili-
tate voluntary deal making outside of bankruptcy:
1. You'd better reach a deal or else you'll just get liquidation
value.
2. If everyone else reaches a deal, you'll be forced to go along.
These threats vanish in the case of states because there is no liqui-
dation option (with absolute priority applied) and thus no best inter-
ests test baseline to protect nonconsenting creditors. Bankruptcy is
only able to bind nonconsenting creditors by giving them at least liq-
uidation value and making the deal in their best interests. 170
Bankruptcy can bring states' creditors together, but if Chapter 9
is the model, then it lacks the leverage to encourage deals in most
cases. The alternative facing a creditor in a state bankruptcy would
not be liquidation, but instead whatever the creditor would get
outside bankruptcy. Thus, creditors that think they will fare better in
the normal course of state politics will be reluctant to deal in bank-
ruptcy. Their own liquidity concerns may encourage deal making in
order to get paid, 171 but this threat is much weaker than liquidation
value.
The only area in which a Chapter 9-based state bankruptcy re-
gime would enhance deal-making leverage might be when the debtor
is dealing with creditors with executory contracts-contracts in which
both the creditor and the debtor still have material obligations. 172
Under current bankruptcy law, including Chapter 9, the debtor may
assume or reject these contracts at its sole discretion.173 An assumed
executory contract is treated as an administrative expense of the bank-
ruptcy estate and receives priority treatment,174 while a rejected exec-
170 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1225(a)(4)-(5), 1325(a)(4)-(5) (2006).
171 Cf Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99
GEO. L.J. 1615, 1617-18 (2012) (observing that liquidity concerns can encourage creditors
to seek liquidation, rather than seeking maximizing returns).
172 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973) (defining an "executory contract" as "a contract under which the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other").
173 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
174 Id. § 503(b) (allowing administrative expenses); id. § 507(a) (2) (establishing prior-
ity for administrative expenses); id. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring allowed administrative ex-
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utory contract is treated as a general unsecured claim.1 75 Collective
bargaining agreements and retiree benefits are exempted from this
treatment for Chapter 11,176 but not for Chapter 9,177 so a wholesale
application of Chapter 9 to states would in fact give states considera-
ble leverage vis-a-vis public employee unions-precisely the target of
proponents of state bankruptcy. Yet it is far from certain that re-
jecting collective bargaining agreements with public employees would
fix states' budgets; if recent experience is any guide, states might well
face serious labor unrest as a consequence, possibly crippling state
government. 1 78
The inherent benefits of bankruptcy as a political tool are uncer-
tain. Unfortunately, bankruptcy could also serve as a mechanism for
carrying out partisan agendas under the cover of judicial robes. As
discussed above, bankruptcy courts have not traditionally had the
power to order tax increases. Instead, they simply supervise spending
cuts. This imbalance in the powers of bankruptcy courts raises serious
concerns that a state bankruptcy regime would be used as a partisan
political device to balance state budgets through cuts to employees'
compensation, services, and benefits, and through service cuts, but
not through tax increases. 179 Indeed, it is notable that only Republi-
can politicians have endorsed the state bankruptcy idea thus far.180
Bankruptcy, then, would be an end run around democratic checks
and balances on distributional decisions, rather than a way of ena-
bling tough political decisions.
As a political tool, bankruptcy could thus be either a means of
forcing states to make unpleasant choices, or it could provide cover
for politicians to make those choices, which may be a good or bad
thing. Bankruptcy can enable good deals or force bad deals. The vir-
tues of bankruptcy as a political tool are hardly certain; it carries with
it the possibility of being abused to carrying out partisan agendas.
Thus, what one makes of bankruptcy as a political tool likely depends
on what outcomes one envisions it producing, and for many that
means considering it as a tool to deal with the political fights of today,
rather than as a long-lasting system.
penses to be paid in cash on the effective date of a Chapter 11 plan as a requirement of
plan confirmation).
175 Id. § 3 6 5(g) (addressing the treatment of rejected executory contracts).
176 Id. §§ 1113-1114.
177 Id. § 901(a).
178 See Davey, supra note 3 (describing the shutdown of the Minnesota government).
179 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 9. Ironically, sovereign bankruptcy in the international context is a
cause associated with the left rather than the right.
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It is possible to envision, however, a state bankruptcy system in
which the court would have the power to direct tax increases or, at the
very least, deny relief absent tax increases.18 1 Leaving aside questions
of constitutionality, such an arrangement would mitigate the danger
of the use of bankruptcy as a factional device. If we were to fantasize
about such a system, would it be a good one? Put differently, are
courts the proper body for making decisions about tax increases and
spending cuts?
Professors Robert Amdursky and Clayton Gillette have noted that
it is unclear whether courts have any institutional advantage over
other bodies, like legislatures, in balancing the conflicting interests of
governments' debtor constituents. i 2 Amdursky and Gillette also ob-
serve some reasons to preferjudicial second-guessing, such as the con-
cern that legislatures will cater to the interests of voters over debt
holders.1 8 3
Amdursky and Gillette's concern is well-taken, but it has broader
application than they could have recognized when they wrote it. Dif-
ferent fora are more or less favorable to different interest groups.
Bankruptcy courts, for example, are a forum that is more favorable to
secured creditors and less favorable to creditors with ongoing con-
tracts, such as vendors and labor, because of the courts' ability to re-
ject executory contracts. In particular, in Chapter 9 bankruptcy,
which proponents cast as the model for a state bankruptcy regime,
181 Already, some courts will not confirm Chapter 13 plans unless they include a mini-
mum dividend paid to unsecured creditors. See, e.g., In re Francis, 273 B.R. 87, 90 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 2002). If such a minimum dividend is higher than the debtor can pay based on
current earnings, the court is effectively requiring either asset sales or more work effort.
This is analogous to requiring the people of a state to contribute more toward meeting the
state's obligations via higher taxes. While the court is not actually ordering the tax in-
crease, the denial of relief would have such an effect. Moreover, a court could conceivably
prohibit payments on other particular favored expenses unless a revenue target is hit. All
of this is to say that a court might be able to coerce a tax increase without actually ordering
one.
A possible way to integrate tax increases into bankruptcy is through a type of insol-
vency test. Chapter 9 currently requires insolvency, by which it means a "balance sheet"
insolvency test, as opposed to an "equity" insolvency test-whether the debtor is paying its
obligations as they come due. See In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003).
One can imagine a third type of insolvency test for states-a "Laffer insolvency" test-
which looks at whether the state can increase tax rates without loss of tax revenue or cut
services without a population flight that would offset the savings with diminished tax reve-
nue. This is a very high threshold. It would, in effect, force the costs of state profligacy
onto the body politic as a whole and make citizens internalize the costs of fiscal irresponsi-
bility. The feasibility of such a Laffer insolvency analysis is, of course, another matter.
182 AMDURSKY & GILLETrE, supra note 52, § 1.3.1.
183 Id.
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collective bargaining agreements and retiree benefits are not subject
to the extra protections that exist in Chapter 11.184
Courts' qualities as decision-making bodies cannot be divorced
from the legal framework in which they operate; courts' discretion is
circumscribed by legislatures, just as legislatures' discretion is circum-
scribed by constitutions. Thus, the relative appeal of courts making
distributional decisions depends heavily on the distributional rules
that courts must follow. If bankruptcy courts could raise taxes but not
cut services, their appeal as a forum would be different than if they
could only cut services but not raises taxes or if they could both cut
services and raise taxes. Accordingly, the same factors that should
concern us about legislative outcomes should also concern us about
judicial outcomes.
Whether one prefers legislatures or courts making budget-balanc-
ing decisions is, of course, a normative matter. But the long-standing
normative choice embodied in the structure of American government
is that distributional decisions beyond a constitutionally mandated
baseline-the ultimate political choice-should be made by
electorally responsive bodies. 18 5 This area is where state sovereignty
184 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113-1114 (2006); cf NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516
(1984) (permitting, before the enactment of §§ 1113-1114, a collective bargaining agree-
ment to be rejected under § 365).
185 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) ("The equal protection obli-
gation imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not an obligation to
provide the best governance possible. This is a necessary result of different institutional
competences, and its reasons are obvious. Unless a statute employs a classification that is
inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights, areas in which the judiciary
then has a duty to intervene in the democratic process, this Court properly exercises only a
limited review power over Congress, the appropriate representative body through which
the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic
problems."); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 769-70 (1975) (applying the standard of
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), to uphold an exclusion from Social Security
benefits); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54, 58 (1973) (upholding
the constitutionality of Texas public school financing, which assures a "basic education for
every child in the State" as "[i] t has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative
of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the
burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the politi-
cal subdivisions in which citizens live" and because "[t]he consideration and initiation of
fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for
the legislative processes of the various States"); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485-86 ("In the area
of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classifica-
tion 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequal-
ity.' . . . To be sure, the cases cited, and many others enunciating this fundamental
standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state regulation of
business or industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves
the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings.... And it is a standard
that is true to the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no
power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
policy." (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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fundamentally collides with bankruptcy law. There is a fundamental
difference between transferring governance rights to creditors from
shareholders and transferring them to creditors from voters. The in-
dividual shareholder has opted into a financial relationship that is
subject to this transfer of governance rights; the individual voter has
not.186 The former is part of the change of control that can occur
during a business bankruptcy, while the latter is an abandonment not
just of sovereignty, but also of democracy.' 8 7
Distributional decisions are political decisions. There are choices
involved in determining whose ox will wax fat and whose will be
gored. Oxen often grow fat at someone's expense or are gored to
someone's benefit. The choice over whether to raise taxes or cut
spending-put more starkly, whether we should cut music and art
classes from school or raise marginal tax rates-is the quintessential
political question about what sort of society to we want to live in. This
is exactly the kind of question that should go before voters rather than
creditors.188
We cannot escape the reality that bankruptcy is itself fundamen-
tally a political exercise because of its distributional nature. Bank-
186 The Tieboutian choice model would indicate consent by the voter based on the
voter choosing to remain in the dysfunctional state. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 648 (1969) (securing the right of interstate travel). Yet the state's fiscal management
is only one of numerous factors in a voter's locational decision-employment, family, state
identity and allegiances, climate, and other factors might weigh in the voter's decision of
where to locate herself and might offset the voter's feelings on the state's fiscal manage-
ment. See id. at 632 ("[W]e do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life
for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers,
among others factors, the level of a State's public assistance."). Also, to be sure, the indi-
vidual voter has elected the officials whose management of the state has led to the current
fiscal problems and the inability to resolve them, and the voter has also elected whatever
Congress and President enacted the changes to federal bankruptcy law that would enable
state debt restructuring.
187 Democracy is the constitutive characteristic of the states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4
("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . ."). While the Supreme Court has long declined to address what the
Guaranty Clause means as being a political question, this in no way takes away from the
democratically constitutive nature of the states. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849);
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). John Hart Ely famously argued
that judicial encroachments on democracy are justified only to protect permanent minori-
ties or to prevent the incumbent majority from obstructing channels of democratic dis-
course. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW passim
(1980). Neither justification would urge judicial resolution of state budgets; instead, it
shows that state budget problems are ordinary political problems, not transcendent ones
that justify abrogating democracy.
188 See Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-27, 627 n. 7 , 630 (1969) (applying
the one-person, one-vote rule to school board elections in the case of a childless renter and
noting that "[s]tatutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose
the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which
substantially affect their lives," and "[t]his is precisely the situation with regard to the size
of the school budget in districts where [a statute limiting the right to vote for school
boards with taxing authority] applies").
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ruptcy is unavoidably distributional-who will bear losses and who will
not? It is a system of picking winners and losers; bankruptcy law im-
plements distributional norms. The distributional nature of bank-
ruptcy makes it an inherently political exercise.
As a result, attempts to explain bankruptcy solely from a con-
tractarian perspective, be it the dominant "creditor's bargain" the-
ory, 18 9 bankruptcy qua procedure, 190 or bankruptcy as team
production' 9' are necessarily incomplete because they do not account
for the politics of and in bankruptcy.1 92 While bankruptcy can be a
response to procedural issues like collective action problems, it is a
response built around a distributional norm, namely that "equity is
equality," meaning similar creditors should have similar recoveries. 193
In the same vein, the major critique of contractarian approaches
to bankruptcy-Professor Elizabeth Warren's argument that it fails to
address noncontractual interests-is also incomplete because, while
broadening the inquiry, it does not address the larger political eco-
nomics of loss allocation in society that determine when and how
bankruptcy law is used. 194 Bankruptcy cannot be understood as a pos-
189 See, e.g.,JAcKSON, supranote 21; Baird, supranote 21;Jackson, supranote 21, at 895
n.17; Jackson & Scott, supra note 21, at 164; Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the
Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 690, 692-94 (1986) (discussing the benefits
and limitations of the creditors' bargain).
190 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 931, 951 (2004).
191 Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 741, 754-64 (2004).
192 Curiously, the importance of political economy considerations has been recog-
nized in scholarship on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, where public-choice
theory has been explored alongside contractarian efficiency theories. See, e.g., Barry E.
Adler, Commentary, Limits on Politics in Competitive Credit Markets, 80 VA. L. REv. 1879 passim
(1994); Clayton P. Gillette, Commentary, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1853 passim (1994); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 638-42 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9,
80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1803 (1994).
'93 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006) (requiring pro rata distribution among similar credi-
tors in a Chapter 7 liquidation); id. § 1129(a) (7) (requiring impaired, nonaccepting credi-
tors to receive at least as much in a Chapter 11 plan as under a Chapter 7 liquidation); id.
§ 1129(b)(1) (prohibiting "unfair discrimination" among impaired, nonaccepting classes
in a plan of reorgnization confirmed under section 1129(b)). The phrase "equity is equal-
ity" is an equity maxim about the treatment of similar parties. It should not be interpreted
to mean that equity holders will fare well in bankruptcy. See also Scott, supra note 189, at
700-07 (discussing a risk-sharing function of bankruptcy by analogy to the "general aver-
age" principle in admiralty law, which requires pro rata sharing of expenses necessary to
save a ship at sea, such as jettisoning of cargo or cutting off a mast).
194 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 779-80 (1987); Eliza-
beth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 366-67
(1993). For other critiques of the contractarian perspective on bankruptcy, see Roy
GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw 24 (2d ed. 1997); KAREN GROSS, FAIL,
URE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 12-14 (1997); David Gray
Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1355 (1987); Karen Gross, Taking
Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 1043-45
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itive matter without accounting for politics, and normative views of
bankruptcy-even those that claim to be apolitical-are necessarily
political statements.
Notably, the creditors' bargain has been developed by scholars
whose primary focus is business bankruptcy, whereas the theory's crit-
ics have tended to focus on consumer bankruptcy, where social policy
issues are more pronounced. 19 5 Business bankruptcy can often oper-
ate in a closed universe of consensual, contractual creditors. Accord-
ingly, contractarian approaches to bankruptcy inherently focus on the
firm and its restructuring on a microeconomic level rather than on
bankruptcy as a piece in a larger macroeconomic system.
Business bankruptcy, however, is but one type of insolvency re-
gime. Individual bankruptcy, bank, and insurance-company insol-
vency, and sovereign and subsovereign state bankruptcy all
immediately implicate issues that go well beyond individual firms'
contractual organization to the political question of loss distribution
in society. Not surprisingly, the scholarship in these subfields of insol-
vency law is highly engaged with the politics of insolvency.
Politics is hardly missing from business bankruptcy. The Bank-
ruptcy Code is replete with explicit special-interest provisions relating
to business bankruptcy (e.g., the treatment of certain financial con-
tracts, 19 6 shopping center leases,1 9 7 airplane leases,' 98 utilities, 199 col-
lective bargaining agreements, 200 as well as numerous implicit special-
interest provisions), but these provisions have been largely ignored by
the creditors' bargain literature.
The consumer bankruptcy literature has, in contrast, had quite a
bit to say about the politics of the Code, particularly after the contro-
versial Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005.201 Yet, the consumer bankruptcy literature has never addressed
the politics of bankruptcy in an integrated way. Instead, it has tagged
individual provisions as abhorrent special-interest deviations, rather
(1994); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 767, 774 (1991).
195 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 576-80
(1998).
196 §§ 362(b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(17), (b)(27), 546(e)-(g), 548(d)(2), 555-556, 559-562.
197 Id. § 365(b) (3).
198 Id. § 1110.
199 Id. § 366.
200 Id. §§ 1113-1114.
201 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23; see, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure
Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565, 600; Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 375, 376-79;
Michael Simkovic, Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 83 AM. BANR.
L.J. 1, 2-4 (2009); Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 77, 77
(2004).
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than consistent with bankruptcy law's nature as a set of political bar-
gains and compromises-a messy, fuzzy, and sometimes shifting armi-
stice line between competing interest groups. 20 2
Indeed, the bankruptcy literature largely ignores the reality that
bankruptcy is part of a larger economic system 203 and functions as
such only because the messy political armistice line prevents either
creditor or debtor interests from dominating. As discussed above,
parties negotiate in the shadow of bankruptcy, which operates as a
fuzzy penalty default rule because of the degree of uncertainty about
bankruptcy outcomes.20 4 Thus, a bankruptcy system cannot be too
favorable to any party or else it will not function well as a penalty de-
fault rule that encourages parties to negotiate on their own. A system
that is too favorable to any party relative to a negotiated outcome will
not incentivize that party to negotiate. 20 5
From the perspective of the larger economic system, then, bank-
ruptcy works best as a penalty default rule if it is sufficiently unattrac-
tive to everyone relative to a negotiated solution. Optimally, no one
should be happy with where the bankruptcy armistice line is, but even
if that is the case, sometimes negotiations fail because of coordination
problems, holdouts, interests in seeing a bankruptcy filing, or lack of
time. Bankruptcy cannot be a suicide pact. While mutually assured
destruction would encourage negotiations, the bankruptcy system has
to be able to redeploy assets, including human capital, and distribute
losses effectively when negotiations fail. Thus, bankruptcy should not
be the creditors' bargain but rather their "unbargain"-the deal that
they would not want, or more precisely, a deal that is second best to a
negotiated deal.
The creditors' bargain hypothesizes the bargain creditors would
strike if they could. But the bargain that creditors would strike very
much depends on particular circumstances, such as creditors' own li-
quidity. 20 6 The idea of a generic, hypothetical bargain is too vague to
provide a meaningful policy guide. When bankruptcy acts as an effec-
202 Indeed, just as ignoring the politics of bankruptcy is a political position, so too is
the empirical turn in consumer bankruptcy scholarship itself part of the political fight,
because the response to the political bargain is to demonstrate empirically how lousy it is
for one or both sides.
203 But see Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the
Wake ofEnron, 2007 COLLUM. Bus. L. REv. 83, 89, 92, 148 (discussing the market in bank-
ruptcy claims as "the residual capital market" and noting the upstream effects of bank-
ruptcy law).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
205 Because bankruptcy involves multilateral negotiations, but filing is primarily at the
debtor's option, a system that is too disfavorable to debtors will cease to function as a
penalty default rule for creditors because it will not be invoked. The possibility of involun-
tary bankruptcy alleviates this problem in theory, but only to the degree that involuntary
bankruptcy is a feasible mechanism for creditors.
206 See Woo, supra note 171.
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tive penalty default rule, it forces the creditors' actual bargain. To get
to the real bargain, bankruptcy must be a less desirable, or at least less
certain, outcome than what creditors would negotiate. By being a
messy, fuzzy, politically negotiated armistice line, bankruptcy law pro-
duces something close to that result.
The bankruptcy history literature necessarily engages with the po-
litical debates over bankruptcy, 20 7 but this literature has never taken
the next step of turning a description of political debates and interest
group contests into a theory of bankruptcy law. Likewise, the small
literature specifically on the politics of bankruptcy reform, 208 by its
very nature of focusing on reform efforts, overlooks that reform and
status quo positions are both expressions of competing interest
groups.
The fundamental problem in bankruptcy is how to divide a pool
of assets that is insufficient to satisfy all claimants. The decision of
who will be paid first, who second, and who last-which could mean
not getting paid at all-are inherently political decisions. While reor-
ganization bankruptcy aims to increase the pool of assets so as to pay
off more claimants, it imposes an additional risk-that the reorganiza-
tion will actually destroy value-so the distributional scheme remains
equally important. All of bankruptcy law is distributional and caters to
particular interests. Indeed, the very existence of bankruptcy law as a
procedural mechanism is itself such a distributional choice. The only
question is the transparency of the choice when it is made.
The normal legislative process, while itself obviously a political
exercise, tempers bankruptcy's political character because the distri-
butional priorities of bankruptcy law are shaped in generic terms, be-
207 See, e.g., EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 103-04, 119-24 (2001); BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 168-69 (2002); DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 23-24, 43-44, 247
n.13 (2001); CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 12-49 (1935);
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 497, 499-507 (1998); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15
BANKR. DEy. J. 321, 323-28 (1999); John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk,
98 Nw. U. L. REv. 303, 305 (2003) (book review).
208 See generally Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adver-
sarial Legalism, 13 J.L. & POL. 893 (1997) (discussing the politics of legal reform in the
context of bankruptcy law); Susan Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy
Law, 74 AM. BANKR. LJ. 77 (2000) (examining the political arguments over whether private
contracts or mandatory legislation should guide firms in bankruptcy); Mark Bradshaw,
Note, The Role of Politics and Economics in Early American Bankruptcy Law, 18 WHITTIER L. REV.
739 (1997) (analyzing how politics shaped early bankruptcy law); Stephen Nunez & How-
ard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and l7oor Voting
in the Legislative Process, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527 (2004) (examining legislative voting on
bankruptcy bills); Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189 (1999) (discussing the shift of political influence over bankruptcy
law); sources cited supra note 201 (analyzing the politics of the Bankruptcy Code).
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hind a Rawlsian veil, 209 due to the fact that legislators cannot be sure
of the identity of the parties in future cases. Sometimes financial insti-
tutions, for example, will be first-lien-secured creditors. Sometimes
they will hold junior liens. Sometimes they will be unsecured credi-
tors. While it might be possible to surmise that most of the time a
particular party will be a first-lien-secured creditor, there is no cer-
tainty that it will always be. For example, a creditor cannot tell ex ante
whether the Bankruptcy Code's provision permitting the avoidance of
preferential payments (voidable preferences) made on the eve of
bankruptcy 210 will be used against it or will increase its recovery as a
creditor. Although the Bankruptcy Code is replete with special-inter-
est provisions,211 the generic terms of the Code are one of bankruptcy
law's great virtues and are critical to establishing its legitimacy as a
distributional regime.
With state bankruptcy proposals, however, the Rawlsian veil of
legislation becomes embarrassingly threadbare. There is no doubt
whose ox is to be gored by state bankruptcy: it is that of organized
labor. Public employees' unions, not municipal bondholders or tax-
payers, are the clear target of state bankruptcy.2 12 State bankruptcy
proposals make no pretense of even being a means of mitigating the
procyclical fiscal problems facing states.213
Rather than fixing state political dysfunction, state bankruptcy
proposals are likely to result in the use of bankruptcy to carry out a
partisan vendetta behind the cover of judicial robes. Such maneuver-
ings only increase state political dysfunction and denude bankruptcy
law of its legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
State bankruptcy proposals offer a financial-restructuring solu-
tion to a political problem, yet the limits of such an approach are
patent. At best, bankruptcy could potentially facilitate political deal
making and reduce the inefficiencies of state politics, but it is equally
possible that bankruptcy will be used to further a partisan agenda in
state budget-balancing debates. In neither scenario, however, does
bankruptcy as a solution even start to touch on the underlying struc-
tural problem of state budgets: the interaction of fiscal federalism with
209 JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 36-42 (1971).
210 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
211 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
212 Halonen, supra note 17 and accompanying text. It is not clear that states need
bankruptcy, however, to reform collective bargaining agreements. Several states have man-
aged to gain significant concessions from their public employees' unions without
bankruptcy.
213 See Galle & Klick, supra note 20, at 190 (discussing the lack of scholarly literature on
this point).
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state legal and political culture. State legal and political culture is un-
likely to change in the foreseeable future, and fiscal federalism is not
quickly or easily rethought, as the issues involved go to the very es-
sence of the federal union. But it is to a reform of fiscal federalism
that we must first look if we are to take state budget crises seriously.
Bankruptcy's limitations in solving state fiscal problems also show
that contractarian theories of bankruptcy are necessarily incomplete
because they fail to address the political economics that shape bank-
ruptcy law. Similarly, critiques of special-interest provisions in bank-
ruptcy law fail to situate these provisions within their context as part of
a shifting and messy armistice line between competing interest
groups. The lesson from the bankrupt politics of state budgets is that
bankruptcy law cannot be separated from its politics.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:13991460
